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INTRODUCTION 
Inland bills of exchange have become a major source 
of credit and finance in New Zealand consequent upon the 
development of discounting facilities of the emerging 
merchant banks. 
Such bills continue to be used for a wide variety 
of purposes and often with the intention of avoiding 
the provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1908 (as 
amended) and with the hope of providing the discounter 
with some form of tax-free gain. That intention still 
prevails but that hope has been either totally or 
partially thwarted by the Legislature. Conceivably 
there remain means of mitigating against the effects 
of the income-tax liability. 
This examination is confined, first, to an 
examination of the discounting of inland bills by merchant 
bills, principally, in the context of moneylending 
and, secondly, to an analysis of the income taxation 
liability attendant upon the purchase of bills by the 
discounter. (An inland bill is one drawn and payable 
in New Zealand or Australia or drawn thereppon some 
person rendent there. Any other bill is a foreign 
bill: section 4 Bills of Exchange Act 1908). 
The very essence of a bill of exchange as a 
negotiable instrument lies in its inherent transferability. 
When that element is considered in the commercial context 
of discounting of inland bills of exchange there are 
manifest first a paucity of modern case-law authorities 
in New Zealand and to a lesser extent in England (for 
discount is seemtn~lY.,,n.earlY. always peripheral, never Victoti · · ~i, y of 
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central even in English decisions), secondly a 
meagreness of text-writer authority and finally 
an awareness of the Inland Revenue Department 
towards imposing either a tax liability on the 
whole of the allegedly capital gain or at least 
attempting to emphasise an inchoate or pre-
existing liability on the amount of the discount 
received. 
Inland trade bills provide many mutual 
advantages: Smith owes money to Jones; Robinson 
is indebted to Smith; Smith can draw a bill on 
Robinson in favour of Jones; Robinson by accepting 
the bill "pays" his debt to Smith; Smith can "pay" 
Jones with the bill; Jones (in addition to presenting 
the bill for payment) can either negotiate the bill 
to a creditor of his own or discount it with a 
merchant bank before it is due for immediate cash 
less a discount deduction. This is the object of 
discounting. The creditor can be assured of immediate 
payment by a certain day. The example given is 
simplified - and adequately illustrative when 
trading entities are substituted for the names 
Smith, Jones, Robinson. 
Negotiability, then, characterises the bill. 
The property is transferable merely by delivery if 
payable to bearer or by indorsement and delivery 
if payable to order so that the holder for the 
time being of the instrument may sue those liable 
on it in his own name and with the effect that the 
property in the bill passes to the bona fide 
transferee for value devoid of any defect in title 
• 
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of the transferor. Section 31 governs negotiation, 
and clearly it is that transaction which embraces 
the discount of a bill. 
Negotiability brings into creation the holder's 
status, and holder is defined (section 2) as "the 
payee or indorsee of a bill or the bearer thereof", 
who is then able to sue in his own name (when 
exercising his right of recourse) any parties liable 
on the bill. 
In the sale and purchase commercially of bills 
by way of discount one must often look but 
obliquely to the Act and directly at a plethora of 
old decisions of England (most of which concern 
insolvency and bankruptcy) delivered long before 
Sir MacKenzie Chalmers's Act of 1882. 
It would be a brave commercial lawyer who would 
today contend that the Act reflects on able, working 
set of rules for the discount, negotiation and advance 
of money on bills of exchange. The fault is not 
totally the draftsman's: any conflict of the law 
cannot be totally attributed to the alleged short-
comings of the Act. The fault lies partly with the 
unfamiliarity of Counsel and the Judiciary in 
dealing with bills. 
The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (Imp.) is a 
declaratory code, and made but few alterations in the 
law relating to bills of exchange. The rules of the 
common law and law merchant relating to bills of 
exchange, promissory notes and cheques remain in 
force except so far as they are inconsistent with 
the Act • 
.. 
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The Bills of Exchange Act 1908 (N.Z.) is a 
consolidation of the Bills of Exchange Act 1883 (N.Z.) 
and its amendments. The New Zealand Act of 1883 was 
an adaptation of the United Kingdom Act which 
substantially codified the general law relating to 
bills of exchange. The New Zealand Act follows the 
latter Act closely and while the New Zealand Act is 
substantially a codifying one, the rules of common 
law including the law merchant save in so far as they 
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act 
continue to apply: section 98(1). 
Discount provides the incentive for the buying 
and selling of bills which represent rivulets of 
credit for banks (both the traditional trading banks 
and the emerging so-called "merchant banks 11 in New 
Zealand) and finance houses and institutions are 
able to canalise such funds into commercially 
productive activities • 
The discount of a bill is neither more or less 
than the transfer of that negotiable instrument for 
a monetary consideration. The discount itself is 
the difference between the price paid and the face 
value of the bill. This is the nature of discount. 
With the advent of "merchant banks" in New 
Zealand and an expansive economy, commercial paper 
has become a vital form of financing for trading 
companies and a significant investment instrument 
for both individuals and companies. The attractiveness 
is partly explicable by the fact that commercial paper 
is regarded by many as a low-risk investment carrying 
a somewhat higher yield than other money- and stock-market 
• 
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investments. 
Late in December 1974 the Reserve Bank (in 
pursuance of section 34A of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Act 1964 as inserted by section 9 of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 1973) 
made a non-binding request to the New Zealand 
finance houses and merchant banks that trade in 
bills of exchange for discount be restricted to a 
minimum amount of $20,000 and that total lending 
be maintained at a level of $180 million. The first 
part of this non-binding request was intended to 
end the practice of "splitting" bills among a 
number of contributories some of whom had been 
advancing sums as small as $1000 towards the 
investment. The second part of the request was 
not in effect met because by the end of December 
1974 $187 million had been invested and represented 
the culminating point in the phenomenal growth in 
the bills market over the then preceding 18 months. 
Merchant banks (through their law advisers) soon 
realised that the non-binding request was non-mandatory 
but a number welcomed the ban on splitting because 
contributed investments entailed bother to them as to 
indorsements, particularly when single investors 
(essentially corporate) had large sums immediately 
available. No request was made to the dealers to 
reduce the effective rate of interest on bills. (Qv., 
subsection (4) of section 34A: 
"The Governor-General may from time to time, 
by Order in Council, specify the rates of 
6. 
interest to be paid to or by financial 
instructions (sic) (other than trading 
banks."). 
Many law practitioners with clients interested 
in investing the now-current minimum of $20,000 
are quite unfamiliar as to what eventuates on the 
purchase of a bill and for that reason some background 
must necessarily be given to the emergence of 
merchant banking in New Zealand and its role in 
discounting, and then to the nature of the whole 
transaction before examining discount and moneylending 
and finally the aspect of taxation on the gain of 
the discounter. 
There has been a reported trend for some 
merchant banks to use 90-day trade bills to finance 
long-term property development (effected by a series 
of re-discounted transactions). 
Potential discounters (and often their advisers) 
have been in a reported quandary as to what precisely 
they got upon making a purchase of a bill. Many appear 
to be under the impression that they had obtained some 
form of commercial security. The investment is 
unsecured. 
The material may be conveniently divided into and 
then examined under the following heads:-
I 
II 
III 
IV 
EMERGENCE OF MERCHANT BANKING IN NEW ZEALAND 
AND ITS ROLE IN THE DISCOUNTING OF INLAND 
BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
NATURE OF DISCOUNTING AND AFFINITY TO 
MONEYLENDING 
EXAMINATION OF TAXATION LIABILITY 
CONCLUSIONS, AND THEN SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
7. 
I EMERGENCE OF MERCHANT BANKING IN NEW ZEALAND AND 
ITS ROLE IN THE DISCOUNTING OF INLAND BILLS OF 
EXCHANGE 
The merchant banks 
The major expansion of merchant banking in New 
Zealand occurred in 1971 when the government allowed 
overseas companies to participate in their establishment. 
Merchant banks began to engage in their underwriting 
activities of new share issues, to advise on and 
finance mergers and takeovers and to lend money for 
expansion to growing companies. The year 1974 saw 
the merchant banks enter the bill of exchange 
discounting business in which commercial paper began 
nationally to be used for the financing of internal 
transactions. 
New Zealand imported the term "merchant bank" 
from England but nothing of the type and extent of 
that activity as carried on· by the prestigious 
merchant banks of the City. Edward J. Reid said 
in his presidential address entitled The Role of 
Merchant Banks Today (and reprinted in Journal of 
the Institute of Bankers 1963): 
"There i s ••• a group of houses in the city 
who are constituents of the Accepting Houses 
Committee and also members of the Issuing 
Houses Association to whom the description" 
(merchant bank) "is usually and indeed 
correctly applied and as this group is 
active and an essential part of the mechanism 
of the City it seems appropriate". 
I 
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But, of course, New Zealand has nothing 
comparable to the accepting side (namely, the provision 
of credit for trade) and the issuing side (the provision 
of capital for industry) as both those terms are 
peculiarly known in the City; however, most merchant 
banks in New Zealand are either the subsidiaries of or 
are affiliated to major merchant banks in the City and 
to an acceptable extent they do perform somewhat 
comparable functions to make the adoption of the term 
"merchant bank" reasonably justifiable; but the 
equation of merchant banks in London with the emerging 
entities in New Zealand using the same name cannot be 
carried too far for the origin, traditions, functions 
and modes of operation of the former have no counter-
part in New Zealand. 
The Accepting Houses Committee perform an 
enormously wide range of services: maintain a money 
market; provide short - , medium - and long-term -
funds to substantial clients; advise on corporate 
reconstructions, mergers and takeovers; underwrite 
both debts and equity issues; finance imports 
and exports; lease "large-ticket" items; manage 
investment portfolios and unit trusts; deal in 
foreign exchange and bullion; and maintain cheque 
facilities for clients. 
The acceptance business in the City does not 
directly involve itself either borrowing or lending. 
Essentially it is the sale of the use of a name as 
effective guarantor that there will be no default 
on the bill of exchange. Such guarantee can only be 
effective if the accepting house is known to have 
-r 
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substantial assets including some so highly liquid that 
bills will invariably be not merely paid but paid at 
the proper moment. The accepting houses are today 
less active with trade bills (unless of a major 
amount concerning commercial and industrial undertakings) 
and deal principally with acceptance credits and the 
documentary letters of credit for the importation of 
foodstuffs and raw materials. In either event extra 
commission is paid to secure a good name on the bill 
which greatly increases the ease of discounting. 
New Zealand merchant banking has no concept 
like the Accepting Houses Committee, and many of the 
latter's activities are by circumstance and necessity 
forbidden territory to merchant banks in New Zealand, 
particularly to overseas companies which require the 
consent of the Minister of Finance to participate 
in the establishment of merchant banks in New Zealand. 
(But there does not appear to be any impediment in the 
Banking Act 1908 (as amended) to a New Zealand-owned 
sharebroking firm carrying on substantially the 
business of merchant banking and eventually to maintain 
cheque facilities once banking becomes its real and 
substantial business (as distinct from an ancillary 
or incidental branch of another business): see State 
Savings Bank of Victoria v. Permewan Wright Co. Ltd 
(1915) 19 C.L.R. 457; and compare United Dominions 
Trust v. Kirkwood (1966) 1 All E.R. 968 in which the 
English Court of Appeal enumerated the characteristics 
usually found in a banker's business at the present 
time and in which Lord Denning, M.R. mentioned (at 975) 
the collection of cheques, crossed and uncrossed, and 
I 
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the withdrawal of funds by cheque. Overseas companies 
established in New Zealand are subject to Part XII 
Companies Act 1955 and (if merchant banks) to the 
Capital (Overseas) Regulations 1965 as amended and to 
the requisite consent of the Minister of Finance.). 
In New Zealand the stature of the company 
appearing on the bill as acceptor or accommodation 
party is the rudimentary and antipodean counterpart 
of the accepting house name on the bill. Indeed the 
names of companies appearing on merchant bank bills 
are household names in New Zealand which are invariably 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. The 
indorsement of the merchant bank provides a contingent 
liability ranking after the drawer. Occasionally an 
accommodation party signs the bill (as drawer, 
acceptor or indorser) without receiving value therefor 
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other 
party so that there is achieved a marked facility in 
negotiating the bill by way of discount. (It (the 
accommodation party) is liable on the bill to the 
discounter and it is immaterial whether when such 
holder for value took the bill, the discounter knew 
such party to be an accommodation party or not: 
section 28(2). 
Most of the companies on the New Zealand bill 
market are so well established and well known that 
these two features invariably appear enough to 
influence the purchase of a bill by discount. 
At the present time, then, the use of the words 
"merchant bank" in New Zealand is a misnomer but it 
is a convenient and differentiating label. Similar 
11. 
functions have been carried on for many years in New 
Zealand by the major underwriting firms. 
The role of discounting 
Commercial bills, commercial paper, bills of 
exchange, or plain bills - all refer to the same 
instrument of credit, the bill of exchange as 
defined in the Bills of Exchange Act 1908. 
Commercial paper consists of unsecured, short-term 
bills of exchange issued by trading and manufacturing 
companies and by the affiliates and subsidiaries of 
commercial and merchant banks. The notes are payable 
to bearer on a stated maturity date. Maturities range 
from 30 to 90 days and often to 180 days. When the 
paper becomes due, it is often "rolled over", that 
is, a new bill is issued, either to the same or a new 
discounter at the market rate ruling at the time of 
its maturity. The discounting procedure is still evolving 
among merchant banks in New Zealand. 
There are two main types of bill: 
(1) The trade bill is often related to a specific 
trading transaction and is used to raise credit 
for manufacturers, traders, finance companies, 
importers and the like. A manufacturer supplies 
a retailer with goods priced at $50,000. The 
manufacturer desires to have immediate cash and 
accordingly draws a bill on the buyer payable 
to order 90 days after acceptance. The buyer 
of the goods accepts the bill or gets his 
trading bank to accept it. The merchant bank 
then buys the bill and it is thereupon entitled 
to receive its face value on maturity. The 
12. 
merchant bank then usually sells the bill by 
discounting it to an investor or the discounting 
bank may act also as the presentor. No 
interest is paid on the bill by any party 
for the effective cost of holding the bill 
is reflected in the discount below face value 
at which the bill is bought and sold. The 
manufacturer no longer holds a book debt but 
as the drawer of the bill it is carrying a 
contingent liability until the bill is met. 
(At least in one sense the purchase of the 
trade bill by the merchant bank equates in some 
ways to selective factoring, accompanied by 
recourse). 
(2) The acceptance or accommodation bills are 
drawn under an acceptance facility extended by 
a merchant bank. These bills are often drawn 
on the merchant bank itself or upon a company 
affiliated with the drawer. Often there is 
no directly related trade transaction or 
there may be collateral mortgages and debentures 
in favour of the merchant bank. Such bills are 
purchased by the merchant bank and so funds 
are provided to the drawer. 
In the first illustration at least three 
independent names appear on the trade bill and all 
are liable. In the second illustration the names of 
two independent companies (including the merchant bank) 
appear on the bill. Whatever pattern is adopted the 
merchant bank acts a fiduciary agent and intermediary 
in effecting the discount of the bill to a private 
.... 
or corporate investor as purchaser. 
At least one merchant bank in New Zealand signs 
its bills as the accepting party which of course is a 
direct undertaking to all other parties that the 
bill will be paid on due date. The majority of 
merchant banks, it appears, sign as indorsers 
(sometimes as guarantors) and the investors'(recourse 
is then directly to the merchant bank but that, of 
course, does not preclude recourse first to both 
drawer and acceptor. The indorser of a bill 
engages that if it is dishonoured then it will 
compensate the holder or subsequent indorser which 
is compelled to pay. Sometimes bills contain 
extension clauses to allow for re-negotiation for 
additional periods and this trend has been detected 
in some 90-day bills which in reality have been 
intended to finance long-term property development 
and acquisition. The trend is not common. This 
continual issue of new (or occasionally the renewal 
of) bills is known as "rolling over" the bills. 
Merchant banks sell the bills to discounters 
at face value. 
The effective annual discount rate varies, of 
course, according to liquidity pressures ruling 
within the money market but for major companies 
bills are often discounte.;.d at a rate which, 
though normally higher than bank overdraft rate, 
is often substantially lower than the rate 
applicable to borrowings from a finance company 
and is often claimed to be normally lower than 
the total cost (including underwriting and 
... 
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legal costs) associated with debenture borrowings. 
Such a rate is the total cost because usually there 
are no brokerage charges or legal costs. 
Bills are currently used for financing medium 
to short-term cash requirements, usually as an 
adjunct to overdraft finance; though at least one 
merchant bank through successive re-discounting 
has attempted to use 90-day bills for long-term 
property development. Generally the use of bills 
enables a company to avoid the unnecessary use of 
long-term finance where the deficiency peaks of 
cash shortages are not long. 
A bill of exchange is defined as "an unconditional 
order in writing addressed by one person to another 
signed by the person giving it" (the drawer) "requiring 
the person to whom it is addressed" (the drawee who 
when he signs becomes the acceptor), "to pay on demand 
or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain 
in money to or to the order of a specified person or 
to bearer" (the payee): section 3, Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908. The drawer and indorsers of a bill are 
jointly and severally liable to the holder for the 
due acceptance and payment; and so if the bill is 
dishonoured the holder may enforce payment from the 
drawer or an indorser or the acceptor or all or 
any of them. The drawer and all indorsers undertake 
a secondary liability. 
By drawing a bill the drawer engages to pay the 
bill if the acceptor makes default but he may qualify 
the terms of that acceptance. 
The payee is often the drawer because the 
r 
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drawer often (at least initially) wants the money 
paid to himself or subsequently wishes to transfer 
it to a discounter who, of course, gives him value 
for it by his purchase. 
The first holder is the payee. Pursuant to 
section 2 holder means the payee or indorsee of 
a bill who is in possession of it or the bearer 
thereof. "Holder" therefore may mean the discounter 
(as well as the payee or indorsee of the bill). 
"Holder" as a term is capable of shading off into two 
other significant terms and meanings for there 
may be a holder for value and a holder in due 
course. 
The indorser is the person who signs the bill 
as part of the procedure of transferring a bill payable 
to order. He is similar to the drawer in that he 
must compensate subsequent parties (including the 
discounter) if the bill is dishonoured. He cannot 
avoid his liability by attacking the signature of 
the drawer or an earlier indorser. Any third 
party who signs a bill other than as drawer or 
as acceptor is liable as if he were an indorser 
whose liability upon signature is to all subsequent 
parties. 
Discounter as holder in due course 
For the holder (in this context the discounter) 
to qualify as a holder in due course he must have taken 
the bill in good faith and for value and at the time 
the bill was negotiated to him he must have had no 
notice of any defect in the title of the person who 
negotiated it to him: section 29(1)(b). The holder 
16. 
who takes a negotiable instrument bona fide (that 
is, by giving value for it and having no notice at 
the time that the party from whom he takes it has 
no title) is entitled to recover upon it, even 
although he may at the time have had the means of 
knowledge of that fact of which means he neglected 
to avail himself: Raphael v. Bank of England (1855) 
17 C.B. 161; 6 Digest 139, 916. (The discounter 
as holder in due course is considered more fully 
post). 
II NATURE OF DISCOUNTING AND AFFINITY TO MONEYLENDING 
Exposition of concept of discounting 
A bill is discounted when it is transferred for a 
monetary consideration which is less than its amount 
by a sum representing a rebate of interest in respect 
of the period which is to elapse before it falls due 
for payment. 
The discount is in effect the difference between 
the price paid and the actual amount of the debt, the 
evidence of which is transferred. 
The actual charge made for discounting a bill is 
generally calculated by applying the appropriate rate 
of interest to the lifetime of the bill. 
In a discounting transaction the bill is sold 
prior to due date for an amount less than its face 
value. The purchaser or discounter becomes the owner 
of the various rights against the signatories 
including the seller (either as drawer or indorser) 
whose liability continues pursuant to the express 
warranties in section 55 (unless , of course , the 
right of recourse against either drawer or indorser 
17. 
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has been restricted: section 16). 
Discounting a bill is not equivalent to paying 
it, and so the acceptor may negotiate it to another 
person, and the drawer and indorsers may become 
liable to a subsequent holder even with notice: 
Harmer v. Steele (1849) 4 Ex. 1, 13. 
To deal in bills of exchange is to traffic or 
trade in them, that is to buy and sell them, or to 
lend on them: London Provincial and South Western 
~ v. Buszard (1919) 35 Times L.R. 142, 63 So.Jo. 
246, followed in Garrioch v. Canadian Bank of 
Commerce (1919) 3 W.W.R. 185 (all of which are cited 
in Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange, 
7th Edn., 1969). 
Falconbridge adds (at 140) that a bill is 
discounted when in consideration of a sum paid by the 
bank, the transferor indorses it to the bank or 
when without indorsement, he becomes liable to the 
bank by agreement or custom in respect of the payment 
of the amount of the bill. The discount is the 
deduction or drawback made from an advance of money 
upon a bill; the difference between the price paid 
and the face value of the bill: In re Land Securities 
Co., ex parte Farquhar (1896) 2 Ch. 320. 
Indorsements 
Transfer to the discounter is vested in him by 
indorsement on the bill. Section 32 provides that an 
indorsement operates as a negotiation, when it is first 
.. 
... 
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written on the bill itself and signed by the 
indorser but a simple signature on the bill or an 
allonge is sufficient; secondly it must be an 
indorsement of the entire bill; a partial 
indorsement does not operate as a negotiation of 
a bill; thirdly the indorsement must be of all the 
payees who are not partners unless one has authority 
to indorse for the others; fourthly where the 
payee or indorsee is wrongly designated or his 
name is misspelt he may indorse the bill as therein 
described: ban~s almost invariably require the 
proper signature to be added; and fifthly where 
there are two or more indorsements each is deemed 
to have been made in the order in which each 
appears on the bill unless the contrary is proved. 
Discounter is a term not defined nor does it 
appear anywhere in the Act but absolute title is 
vested in him by indorsement and therefore the 
transfer by indorsement vests in both the discounter 
and the indorsee a right of action against all 
parties whose names are on the bill in case of 
default of acceptance or (and this is the 
appropriate eventuality for the discounter) payment 
and against an innocent discounter or indorsee for 
value, no prior party can set up the defence of 
fraud, duress, illegality, or absence of 
consideration: section 29 (Holder in due course); 
and Hamilton Finance Co. Ltd v. Coverley Westray Ltd 
(1969) 1 Lloyds Reports 53. 
Mocatta, J. in Hamilton thought that the word 
"discount" was inapplicable to the case where the 
.. 
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party for whom the bill was discounted received 
the face amount of the bill from the discounting 
bank which then recovered the charges from the 
acceptor. "In these somewhat unusual circumstances 
it seems to me that the word 'discount' is a misnomer 
and that what in fact happened was that the second 
defendants bought the bills from the first defendants 
at their face value for a consideration passing to 
them from Nassauer". (The plaintiffs claimed 
against the first defendants (Coverley Westray) and 
the second defendants (Portland Finance Co. Ltd), 
drawers and indorsers and indorsers respectively of 
five bills accepted by Nassauer Bros. Ltd, wine and 
spirit merchants of which the plaintiffs were allegedly 
the bearers and holders in due course. The bills were 
dishonoured on presentation). 
A bona fide holder for value of a bill of 
exchange without notice of any defect in the title 
of his transferor holds it free from equities 
affecting his transferor. Mocatta J. in Hamilton 
held (at 66) that the discounter of the bill of 
exchange which had been forged was entitled to 
recover from the innocent vendor as for a total 
failure of consideration. And at 67, he added: 
"In the ordinary case of the purchase of a 
bill of exchange the purchaser in my 
judgment expects to receive an instrument 
which then and there gives him a right to 
recover against the acceptor thereof on the 
due date of payment and, failing payment by 
the acceptor on the due date, a right to 
20. 
recover against prior indorsers or the drawer. 
He is not to be left in a state of uncertainty 
as to his legal rights depending upon the 
generosity of the paying banker and its 
customer." 
That statement is in effect an application of 
section 38 which provides that the holder in due course 
of a bill of exchange (of which the discounter is 
such) holds the bill free from any defect of title of 
prior parties as well as mere personal defences 
available to prior parties among themselves, and 
(more importantly as Hamilton illustrates) may enforce 
payment against all parties liable under the bill. 
In Elliott v. Bax-Ironside (1925) 2 K.B. 301, the 
indorsement was affixed by means of a rubber stamp and 
the acceptance handwritten. 
In Arab Bank v. Ross (1952) 1 All E.R. 709, 
Denning L.J. (at 716) pointed out that three concepts 
should be differentiated when considering indorsements, 
namely their regularity for the purpose of holding in 
due course; their validity for the purpose of passing 
the property in the instrument; and their efficacy 
for the purpose of imposing liability. (Clearly 
all three are important as to discounting). The test 
of regularity is whether ex facie the instrument , it is 
apparent that the indorsement is that of the named 
payee (or indorsee or discounter upon re-discount). 
An indorsement is irregular whenever it is such as to 
give rise to doubt whether it is the indorsement of 
the named payee. Regularity is a different thing 
from validity. And in Arab Bank the indorsement was 
• 
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irregular (a note payable to the partnership -
"F. & F.N. Co." being indorsed "F & F.N. 11 ) but 
valid for the purpose of passing property. 
Regularity is different from liability. A 
person who makes an irregular indorsement is 
liable thereon notwithstanding the irregularity. 
If a payee who is wrongly described on the bill 
indorses it in his true name alone, that indorsement 
is likely to be irregular (Arab Bank (at 715))but 
is sufficient to impose liability. But a regular 
indorsement if it is forged or unauthorised will 
not impose any liability on the person whose 
indorsement it purports to be: Arab Bank (at 715). 
An agent may be employed to get a bill discounted: 
he then has implied authority to warrant it a good 
bill but not to endorse it in the name of his 
principal: Fenn v. Harrison (1790) 3 Term Rep. 757; 
(1791) 4 Term Rep. The authority and duties of a 
bill broker entrusted with bills for discounting 
depend upon the course of dealing and usage of the 
particular place where such bill broker is employed, 
in the absence of instructions to the contrary: 
Foster v. Pearson (1835) 1 C. M. & R. 849. The rule 
laid down in this case that it was not unusual or 
unreasonable for bill brokers in the City of London 
to raise money for their employers by pledging the 
bills of different proprietors for one advance, was 
distinctly upheld and applied in the case of a pledge 
of securities en bloc by a stockbroker: London Joint 
Stock Bank v. Simmons (1892) A.C. 201; Fuller v. 91.:l!!, 
Mills & Coy (1914) 2 K.B. 168; Bentinck v . London 
Joint Stock Bank (1893) 2 Ch. D. 120. 
r 
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Negotiation and advance 
Apart from the discount of a bill, negotiation 
and advance must be differentiated for a bank (merchant 
or trading) which negotiates the bill as a holder in 
due course and a bank which advances a percentage 
on the bill as a holder for value are quite separate. 
Section 27(1)(a) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 
recites that valuable consideration for a bill may 
be constituted by, inter alia, any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract. The 
consideration for a bill need not necessarily (and 
rarely is) be equal to its face value and so a bank 
may be constituted a holder in due course even if it 
advances a small amount against it and similarly the 
payment to the seller of the bill's full amount 
will not by itself make the bank a holder in due 
course because that bank must be able to demonstrate 
that it obtained the bill in conformity with the 
conditions specified in section 29(1): the bill 
must be complete and regular on its face and so if 
the seller has been paid the full amount of an 
irregular bill, the bank will not be a holder in due 
course; and the bank must have taken the transfer 
of the bill and so if the bill is payable to the bank's 
own order and delivered by the seller then the bank 
is not a person who has taken the bill and accordingly 
cannot be constituted a holder in due course. The 
bank will be a holder for value and that status 
will be enhanced by the advancement of the full amount 
of the bill: Jones v. Waring and Gillow Ltd (1926) A.C. 670. 
The expressions "holder for value", "holder who 
h . 1 " has taken for value" and "holder who as given va ue 
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occur throughout the Bills of Exchange Act with no 
indication that they all or any two share a common 
meaning; but the current editions of Chalmers on 
Bills of Bills of Exchange and Byles on Bills of Exchange 
both suggest that no distinction is to be drawn 
between the expressions "holder for value","holder 
who has taken for value" and "holder who has given 
value" (see too National Westminster Bank Ltd v. 
Barclays Bank (1974) 3 All E.R. 830, 
The effect of the negotiation of a bill (and in 
this context such negotiation is effected by the 
transferee purchasing the bill) is to give such 
transferee if he took the bill bona fide and for 
value a good title to the bill notwithstanding 
the defect in title of any prior parties. This is 
the hallmark of negotiability, and it is one which 
endows the title of the transferee who is a holder 
in due course. The original payee will not, of course 
be a holder in due course for the bill was not 
negotiated to him: R.E. Jones Ltd v. Waring and Gillow Ltd. 
A holder is a payee or indorser of the bill who is in 
possession of it, and hence will be the discounter. 
Not every holder is a holder in due course but he is 
deemed to be a holder in due course until the contrary 
is proved. 
Under section 38 the holder of the bill may sue 
upon it in his own name; and if he is a holder in due 
course , then he holds the bill free from any defect 
of title of prior parties as well as from mere personal 
defences available to prior parties among themselves 
II 
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and may enforce payment against all parties liable 
on the bill. But freedom "from mere personal defences 
available to prior parties among themselves" will not 
grant the discounter any impregnable position of 
security and safety if the discounter (as part of 
the consideration for his purchase of the bill) has 
been a party to any innocent misrepresentation: 
Kinsman v. Kinsman (1912) 5 D.L.R. 871 because 
subsection (b) is clearly concerned with defects in 
the title of prior parties and not with the instance 
given where the discounter as payee has placed 
himself in a vulnerable position because of his 
own volition concerning such a defect. 
Discount must be distinguished from both the 
deposit of a bill for collection and the holding of 
a bill as security. The test does not depend 
essentially or exclusively on the existence of an 
indorsement but (on the one hand) the intention to 
effect an absolute transfer with resultant full 
power to go against all parties on the bill; or 
merely enabling the person with whom the bill is 
deposited to receive the amount from the other 
parties: Ex parte Twogood (1812) 19 Ves. 229; 
34 E.R. 503 (which indicates that such indorsement 
is prima facie evidence of discount unless the object 
of mere deposit is manifest; or merely to allow the 
obtaining that part of the proceeds in repayment of 
the debt owing under the security: ~ v. Furnival 
(1833) 1 C and M 538; 149 E.R. 513. 
Discount, collection and security, then, must all 
be distingushed. The prevailing presumption obtaining 
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in each of the above sets of circumstances is that 
the holder holds absolutely and not by way of 
security: Hills v. Parker (1866) 14 L.T. 107; 
Re Boys, Eedes v. Boys, ex parte Hop Planters' Co. 
(1870) L.R. 10 Eq. 467. 
Discount is distinct from pledge, mortgage 
Sometimes the terms "discounting" and "negotiating" 
are treated as synonymous but the better practice is 
to use the term "discounting a bill" to describe 
the sale of an accepted bill, by the payee or the 
holder (as the case may be) to a bank or private 
discounter. If the bill changes hands before it has 
been accepted this should properly be called the 
"negotiation" of the bill. In short, a bill is not 
ready to be discounted until it has been accepted. 
Property does not pass until the bill is 
discounted: Dawson v. Isle (1906) 1 Ch 633 in which 
Warrington J. had to determine whether a bill of 
exchange entered in a company's books as a receivable 
bill and handed to the bank for discount remained a 
debt due to this company. Warrington J. (at 639) 
said: 
"It was in reality not an absolute indor sement 
intended to pass the property to the bankers 
at the moment but an indorsement which was 
intended to enable them to discount the bill, 
and when they discounted the bill then to pass 
the property; and it seems to me that until 
discounted the property in the bill did not 
actually pass to the bankers 
belonged to the company. 
II . . . . That 
L 
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The decision is based on imputed intention of the 
company in handing the bill to the bank conditionally 
and for the purpose of its being discounted. The 
money due on the bill was a book debt the amount of 
which was to be considered in ascertaining the purchase 
price of the company's shares. 
Distinction from moneylending 
Buying bills at a discount, that is for their 
face value at date of purchase is well-known and quite 
distinct from moneylending: Chow Yoong Hong v. Choong 
Fah Rubber Manufactory (1962) A.C. 209 (P.C.) per Lord 
Devlin (at 215). (The question was whether buying 
bills at a discount constituted a loan of money to 
the vendor of the bill), Lord Devlin added: 
"Nowadays the buyer is usually a bank or a 
discount house but the fact that he cannot be 
put into either of those categories does not 
alter the nature of the transaction, neither 
does the designation of the discount as 
interest. There is here no loan of money 
and no promise of repayment. Their Lordships' 
conclusion on this point is in accordance with 
the decision of Branson, J. in Old Discount Co. 
11£ v. John Playfair Ltd (1938) 3 All E.R. 275 
that a purchase of book debts for a specific 
sum of money was not a moneylending transaction." 
(In Playfair Branson, J. had to consider whether 
the assignment of book debts due or to become due 
under instalment contracts of sale in consideration 
of an immediate lump-sum payment (the value of 
the debts less a discount) amounted to a loan. The 
r 
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assignor agreed to act as agent for the 
assignee to collect the debts from the 
purchasers and also to give a series of 
monthly bills to secure payment by such 
purchasers of their debts. He held that 
the transaction entered into by the parties 
was not a moneylending transaction at all 
and he reasoned that it was not sufficient 
to say that the defendant could have entered 
into such loan transaction if the same 
result could have been attained by effecting 
a sale). 
Lord Devlin in Chow Yoong Hong str~ngly relied 
on the principle implicit in Playfair that it is 
the nature of the agreement and not its object at 
which the Court must look to decide whether any 
agreement was a moneylending one or otherwise. 
Playfair was a decision on the English Moneylenders 
Act 1927 and Chow Yoong Hong on the Malayan Moneylenders 
Ordinance. Neither of these statutes defines "loan" 
and so each question had to be answered on general 
principles. In most of the Australian States and the 
Australian Capital Territory the statutory definition 
of loan includes both discount and "every contract 
(whatever its terms or form may be) which is in 
substance or effect a loan of money", but !12! the 
New Zealand Moneylenders Act 1908 (as amended). 
However, Finlay J. in Cash Order Purchases Ltd 
v. Brady (1952) NZLR 898 at 914 laid down what he 
held to be the correct approach: 
I 
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"My conception is that we must find the 
pith and substance of the arrangements by a 
consideration of the documents, and then, if 
necessary, proceed to consider whether it is 
established by relevant evidence that the 
pith and substance as represented by the 
documents was not the true pith and substance, 
but that the documents were a mere cloak to 
conceal the true character of the arrangement. 
I have used the expression 'relevant evidence' 
because it is a question of fact to be 
established by evidence that the documents 
are a mask for another and different transaction". 
(Cash Order is !121 concerned with the discount 
of bills of exchange, but with moneylending. However 
it contains an important enunciation of the law because 
the Full Court distinguished Playfair and held that 
the Court was entitled to inquire into the true and 
real nature of the transaction and that it could go 
behind the agreements whatever they purported on their 
face to effect. The Court was exercising its general 
jurisdiction and one which (it is suggested) could be 
strengthened by appropriate definition of "loan" to 
include the discount of a bill of exchange and with further 
provision that the Court be empowered to examine the 
intentions of the parties upon prima facie evidence 
appearing to the Court's satisfaction of a device (in 
the form of discount of bills of exchange) designed to 
avoid the provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1908 (as 
amended)). 
. -
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Many transactiol'l5involving the purchase of 
chattels involve the drawing and discounting of 
trade bills, and with the retailer selling the 
goods to a finance company for the cash price 
(including the deposit which is paid directly to 
the retailer by the hirer) and with the finance 
company letting them on hire purchase to the hirer 
for the cash price plus the hire purchase charges, 
principally interest. In Playfair a series of 
monthly bills was given to secure the due payment 
of customers' instalments under the contracts of 
sale. In Chow Yoong Hong the vendor of the bills 
gave his own post-dated cheques for the same amount 
which were payable on the dates when the bills 
matured. Lord Devlin rejected (at 215) that the 
existence of this latter security pointed to the 
true na ture of the transaction as being a loan: 
"Their Lordships are satisfied that the 
post-dated cheques do not affect the 
nature of the transactions. A buyer of 
a bill naturally wants to have recourse 
to the seller of it as well as to the 
drawer; and in the ordinary way he will 
obtain this because the seller will also 
be the indorser of the bill. If so it is 
difficult to see what added advantage the 
plaintiff got from the post-dated cheques, 
and in any event they could not have done 
more than put the defendants in the 
ordinary position of indorsees" • 
L 
30. 
Playfair and Chow Yoong Hong both, then, mean 
that where there is a genuine sale and discount of 
bills (and too of instalment contracts of sale, 
hire purchase contracts and book debts) in 
consideration of an immediate lump-sum payment 
less than the value, the transaction does not 
amount to a loan and neither does the presence of 
the vendor providing security for the purchaser 
nor too where the vendor acts as the purchaser's 
agent for collection alter that conclusion. 
Rowntree case 
The terms "borrowing" and "lending" are subject 
to such permutations and combinations in the context 
of transactions at law that the precise meanings to 
which such words can be ascribed gained a new 
dimension in the little-celebrated Court of Appeal 
(English) decision of Inland Revenue Commissioners 
v. Rowntree & Co. Ltd (1948) 1 All E.R. 482 (C.A.) 
for it is a case which while dealing both with the 
discounting of bills of exchange and borrowing and 
lending has drawn no comment in Byles on Bills of 
Exchange (23rd Edn., 1972), Megrah and Ryder), nor 
in Paget's Law of Banking (8th Edn., 1972 Megrah and 
Ryder) nor in The Law of Moneylenders in Australia 
and New Zealand by C.L. Pannam (1965) nor in Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods (1st Edn., general editor, A.G. Guest). 
There was present the usual tripartite arrangement 
with the third party being the acceptance house but 
the facts of the case are usual only in that respect 
and the decision constitutes an illuminating slant 
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on both moneylending and discounting generally, and 
indeed Rowntree provides a totally different attitude 
than the comments of Lord Devlin in Chow Yoong Hong 
in which reliance is placed (without any examination) 
on the dicta in Olds Discount that"··· buying bills 
at a discount •••• is quite discount from moneylending." 
That statement (it is suggested) is demonstrably not 
correct, at least at first face, for both are two 
commercially well-known methods of raising money. 
With respect it appears somewhat ingenuous to 
suggest that the business of each is quite distinct 
when the result of each is exactly the same: the 
raising of money. The method used should not be 
allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act. 
Briefly in Rowntree the company raised money for 
its business by drawing sight bills, payable at 
four and six months on the acceptance house which 
accepted the bills in consideration of a commission 
paid to them by the company, and then as agents 
for that company discounted the bills on the market 
and remitted the proceeds to the company. 
The arrangement was that the company was bound 
to put the acceptance house in funds shortly before 
maturity of the respective bills. Money was raised 
in this way. 
The Special Commissioners held inter alia that 
in ordinary commercial usage the relationship among 
the company, the acceptance house and the holder of 
the bills was not that of borrower and lender nor 
were the transactions ones of loan. They therefore 
held that the money so raised was not "borrowed money" 
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(within the meaning of the English Finance (No. 2) 
Act 1939 and accordingly was not deductible. 
(The case is admittedly a taxation one but 
its implications extend beyond Revenue matters 
because the Special Commissioners, the Court at 
first instance and then the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that the words "borrowed money" 
had to be construed in accordance with commercial 
usage and demonstrably that embraces moneylending 
transactions). 
Macnaghten J. came to a contrary view to that 
of the Special Commissioners and he dealt with 
the argument which had been advanced (1947) 2 All 
E.R. 474 before him in these words: 
"It is said on behalf of the company that, 
for there to be a borrowing of money, there 
must be a lender as well as a borrower, and 
that no-body lent any money to the company. 
For the Crown it is said that the money of which 
the company had the use for the period of the 
bills was lent either by the discount house 
or by Erlangers Ltd. I am unable to see how 
it can be said that the acceptance house 
lent any money. It is the function of an 
acceptance houset to lend its name as acceptor, 
but it does not lend any money to anybody. 
The acceptance house need not have any money 
at all, if the person for whom the acceptance 
house accepts the bill fulfils his obligation 
of providing cash to meet the bill when it 
falls due. It was the discount house which 
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provided the money of which the company 
had the use for the period of the bill 
and no longer". 
Macnaghten J. therefore held that it was 
borrowed money in "the ordinary acceptation" 
of that word. The borrowers were the company 
and the lenders the discount house. His 
decision was reversed on appeal. 
Somervell, L.J. held (at 487) that the 
Solicitor-General's definition was not an accurate 
one of lending when it was claimed that there is 
a lending whenever a person makes or undertakes 
to make available for another person money which 
that other person subsequently has to pay back to 
someone. He explained: 
"The answer that I would give to that is that, 
in my view, that is not an accurate definition 
of lending. I think that the Solicitor-General's 
argument rather proceeded on the basis that 
any 'raising' of money must be regarded as a 
"borrowing" of money. There I think it fails, 
and I agree with the learned judge, for the 
reasons which he gives, that Erlangers cannot 
be regarded as lenders. Nor do I think (and 
here I disagree with the learned judge) that 
the discount house can be regarded as lenders. 
It seems to me that this case brings out very 
well that there are two ways at least (there 
may be more) of raising money. One is by 
borrowing it and the other is by discounting 
a bill of exchange. They are both quite well-
known methods. One is borrowing and the other 
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is discounting a bill. The fact that in 
many cases they produce the same result of 
providing financial resources for carrying 
on a business does not mean that words 
which are apt to describe one must be 
construed as covering the other •••• 
'Borrowed' money is a familiar phrase. 
It is possible that in certain contexts 
it might have a rather wider meaning than 
it would have, say, in the strict context 
of a legal pleading, but looking at the 
transaction as a whole, I have come to the 
conclusion that these sums were not borrowed 
in any ordinary meaning which can be given 
to that expression ••• 11 • 
Tucker and Cohen, L.JJ delivered concurring 
judgments. 
It is common now for wholesalers and retailers 
selling goods under instalment contracts of sale and 
hire purchase agreements to obtain immediate cash 
in respect of the bills of exchange held by selling 
the bills at a discount (and sometimes with the 
necessary assignment of the contracts). Alternatively 
the bills or contracts may be assigned by way of 
mortgage and it is then clear that a loan has been 
effected. The transactions may be separate or be 
inter-related. 
In Olds Discount Branson J. held (at 276-77) 
"···· that upon the face of these documents, 
it is perfectly clear that the transaction 
entered into ••• was not a moneylending 
I 
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transaction at all, but a transaction under 
which the plaintiffs (the assignees of the 
bookdebts) purchased from the defendants 
certain bookdebts for certain payments •• there 
is no doubt that •• the agreement is a 
perfectly good and lawful agreement, 
notwithstanding that the operative reason 
in the minds of the defendants (that is the 
assignors) for entering into it was that they 
desired to raise money as a temporary matter 
in the same way as they would have raised it 
if they had merely entered into a transaction 
of loan." 
And in Chow Yoong Hong, Lord Devlin explicitly 
approved (as already indicated) Olds Discount and 
(at 215) added: 
"The business of buying bills at a discount, 
that is for their value at the date of 
purchase, is well-known and quite distinct 
from moneylending". 
Notwithstanding the statements implicitly meaning 
that discounting bills constitutes a lending of money 
made by Farwell J. in Litchfield v. Dreyfus (1906) 
1 K.B. 584 which has been over-ruled by Olds Discount 
and more importantly by Chow Yoong Hong the dividing 
line between the transactions is thin and accordingly 
what Finlay J. said (at 914) in Cash Order represents 
demonstrably the more realistic approach and one 
calculated to give effect to the true intent, meaning 
and spirit of the Moneylenders Act (as amended) whenever 
the existence of discount is prima facie evidence of 
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lending. 
The most frequently encountered manner of evading 
the requirements of the Moneylenders Act 1908 as 
amended is to substitute an intended loan by a sale 
and for the vendor to add: "I'll draw a bill on you 
for the amount of the 'sale' we thereby arrange" and 
for such bill to be subsequently discounted. The 
Courts have drawn a distinction between a loan on the 
one hand and the extension of credit concerned with 
a sale-by-way-of instalments on the other hand. The 
former clearly constitutes a moneylending transaction 
while the latter is not. 
Much depends on the intentions of the parties 
and the surrounding circumstances. If they agree to 
arrange their transaction as a sale, then it is largely 
irrelevant that the same result could have been 
produced by borrowing or by lending money: Chow Yoong 
Hong (per Lord Devlin at 216-17). 
(Indeed, it may not be too unfair to say that the 
words of Lord Devlin should not be given too great a 
weight of authority for his reputation was made not in 
his judgments on commercial law and indeed in Baker v. 
Barclays Bank Ltd (1955) 1 WLR 822 Devlin J. (as he then 
was) said (at 833) that he was not entirely clear how 
it benefits the bank to establish that the customer for 
whom they collected was a holder in due course. He 
does not appear to have acknowledged the existence 
of section 29(3) of the Bills of Exchange Act). 
Chow Yoong Hong and Olds Discount both lean to a 
generous and (it is suggested) a some what unrealistic 
interpretation (and one which has found support in South 
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Africa in Tucker v. Ginsberg (1962) (2) S.A. (W.L.D.) 58) 
whereas~ Order indicates an examination to determine 
the reality. Indeed it is mere playing with words to 
suggest first that the object of discounting and 
moneylending are the same and then in the same breath 
to say that the nature of the two transactions is 
fundamentally different. It is laudable for the Court 
not to stop sh9rt at accepting the terms used by the 
parties but instead to acknowledge the duty to go 
further to examine the true nature of the transaction. 
However the usefulness of that latter exercise is 
vitiated if the Court abandons any correct adjudication 
when it locates any element (whether principal or 
subsidiary) of discounting forming an integral part 
of a moneylending transaction for "the documents are", 
then, "a masjk for another and different transaction", 
and it is the Court's duty to say what that transaction 
is and not to excuse itself by speaking of a 
11 fundamentally different" transaction in the form of 
discounting. The Courts perform no discharge of public 
duty imposed upon them by the Moneylenders Act by such 
transparent rationalising. There is already sufficient 
uncertainty in commercial law which is partly attributable 
to the Moneylenders Act. If a transaction is prescribed 
by the law then it cannot be validated if achieved by 
one method and invalid (and therefore illegal) if 
achieved by another. There is need for certainty and 
that can be attained by unanimity concerning the test 
to be applied. 
11 Loan11 should be defined in the Moneylenders Act 
as to include the discount of a bill of exchange and 
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to include every contract which is in substance or 
effect a loan of money. 
Authorities are in conflict about the position 
at law arising from the transfer by a moneylender of 
a bill of exchange obtained under a harsh and 
unconscionable transaction (that is one which is 
"unreasonable and not in accordance with the 
ordinary rules of fair dealing": Samuel v. Newbold 
(1906) A.C. 461, per Lord Macnaghten at 470). 
Under section 38(b) of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908 a holder in due course holds a bill of 
exchange free from any defect of title or prior 
parties as well as from mere personal defences 
available to prior parties among themselves and may 
enforce payment against all parties liable on the 
bill. Under section 29(1) a holder in due course 
is a party who takes the bill for value and without 
notice of any defect in title of the transferor. 
The question arises (more academically than 
practically now) whether a finance house or a 
merchant bank is such a holder in due course. The 
Moneylenders Act 1908 is silent on this point. 
In Stenning v. Radio and Domestic Finance Limited 
(1961) N.Z.L.R. 7 held that if a holder takes notes 
which he knows to be a security for a credit 
transaction, then he is deemed to have knowledge of 
any defect in the title of the transferor and cannot 
become a holder in due course. 
Two Australian decisions take a different view 
Scottish Loan Finance Co. v. Payne (1935) 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 
39. 
175; and Automobile Finance of Australia Limited v. 
Henderson (1928) 23 Tas. L.R.X. 9. 
III EXAMINATION OF THE TAXATION LIABILITY 
The law in New Zealand has paid scant attention 
to inflation (admittedly, the Judicature Amendment 
Act 1974 has empowered the Court to award interest 
up to 7½ per cent in place of the previous 5 per cent); 
and generally when it has, the result has often been 
proscriptive measures aimed ostensibly at its causes 
(the Property Speculation Tax Act 1973) and never 
to palliative measures directed at its effects which 
measures would allow the latent fertility of the 
process of judicial creativity to permit not only 
justice to be done but for the law to develop to 
cover a wide canvas of differing circumstances. 
The most recent example of the former legislation 
is the Land and Income Tax Amendment Act (No. 2) 1974 
which when in the Bill stage was prefaced by 
conflict and contradiction in Ministerial and 
departmental statements purporting respectively to 
justify and explain the need for and the meaning of 
the proposed legislation. 
The new section 5 extends the meaning of 
section 88(1)(ff) of the Land and Income Tax Amendment 
Act 1969 (which related only to registered Treasury 
Bills) to include all "commercial bills" as defined 
in the new section 88(4). 
The effect of the new section is that the 
assessable income of a taxpayer in the income year 
commencing April 1, 1975 (and in every subsequent 
year) is to include:-
40. 
* the amount received on the redemption of a 
commercial bill to the extent to which that 
amount exceeds the cost to the taxpayer of 
the bill; 
* where the bill is not redeemed but disposed 
of by the taxpayer the value of the bill on 
the day of the disposal to the extent to 
which that value exceeds the cost to the 
taxpayer of the bill. 
"Commercial bill" and "bill" are defined in 
section 88(4) culminating in the comprehensive 
paragraph (e) which includes any document or 
agreement which has substantially the same purpose 
or effect as any of the other items included in the 
definition which expressly does not include any 
debenture or bond for the payment of any security 
issued by any body corporate or any security in 
respect of land and which expressly includes any 
share or interest in any of the items mentioned in 
the definition. 
alia: 
The Explanatory Note to the Bill recited inter 
"At present the assessable income of a taxpayer 
includes the amount received on the redemption of 
a Treasury Bill to the extent to which that amount 
exceeds the cost to the taxpayer of the Bill. 
Where it is not redeemed but is disposed of by 
the taxpayer, his assessable income includes the 
value of the Bill on the day of disposal to the 
extent to which that value exceeds the cost to 
p 
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him of the Bill. This clause (clause 4A) extends 
II this provision to include all commercial bills 
The Bill (it is contended) was hasty and ill-
conceived and one that attracted confused and 
. . . . 
inconsistent statements purporting to justify and 
explain its need and meaning. 
The Minister of Finance: "Profits from trading in 
commercial bills could become taxable, the Minister of 
Finance, Mr Tizard, told Parliament last night. He said 
that the Inland Revenue Department was looking into the 
question. In the hands of individuals, the earnings 
were tax-free but where they were traded by firms and 
individual dealers they were liable to taxation ••• " 
(The Dominion, October 24, 1974). 
Merchant bankers and bill dealers: "Both said it 
was news to them that bills were not already taxable. 
'We've never felt that there was a loophole there,' 
said one bill dealer. 'There is no way that they 
can be tax free,' said another merchant banker." 
(The Dominion, October 26). 
Inland Revenue Department: "The deputy chief 
commissioner of the Inland Revenue Department, Mr T.M. Hunt, 
said his department had always maintained that these 
profits were taxable. However some doubt has been 
raised whether an individual dabbling once in the bill 
market might have to pay tax on the capital gain". 
(The Dominion, October 26). 
"Profits made from short-term commercial bills are 
in all cases liable to income tax even under the old 
legislation, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Department, Mr D.A. Stevens, said in a statement 
• 
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today. He said tax-payers, whether they were dealers 
or had only taken up bills in isolated instances, 
should include commercial bill profits in their 
returns for the current tax year. Legislation 
passed last week had as its starting point profits 
on securities or documents sold or maturing during 
the year starting on April 1, 1975. The department 
felt obliged to advise taxpayers of its attitudes 
to profits made in the current year ending on 
March 31, 1975, Mr Stevens said even though the 
legislation will not then have taken effect. The 
facts in each particular case were important, Mr 
Stevens said. He listed specific circumstances in 
which discount profits would be assessable. These 
were: 
"In respect of mortgages, bills, bills of 
exchange, promissory notes and other such 
securities - assessable in all cases where 
maturity or sale is within two years from 
the date of acquisition. 
"In respect of mortgages discounted when the 
tax-payer had entered into more than one such 
transaction, or the expiry of the term of the 
mortgage is within two years from the date of 
acquisition, or the discount profit was greater 
than the interest receivable for the unexpired 
term of the mortgage • 
"There would be other types of cases in which 
profits would be assessable and the period of 
two years mentioned should be regarded as a 
general guide only". (The Dominion, November 9, 1974). 
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(Since the making of the statements by the 
Inland Revenue Department's commissioner and chief 
deputy commissioner, Mr D.A. Stevens retired as the 
commissioner on April 30, 1975 and Mr T.M. Hunt 
succeeded to the commissionership). 
What is immediately apparent (before any 
detailed examination and comparison is made of 
the statements) that Mr Tizard's statement that 
"in the hands of individuals the earnings are 
tax free ••• 11 is much too sweeping to be correct 
and that Mr Hunt's statement that his department 
had always maintained that these profits were 
taxable is again too comprehensive to be correct. 
The truth lies somewhere in between for neither 
speaker has acknowledged the meaning and effect 
of section 88(1)(c) which imposes liability if 
either the business of the tax-payer or the 
purpose of acquisition was the selling or otherwise 
disposing. 
Each of the above quotations is worthy of 
attention first for what each particular statement 
says in itself and secondly for what each says when 
read in succession with the other statements. 
Mr Tizard said initially that profits could 
become taxable and then later added that in the hands 
of individuals the earnings were tax-free. In the 
same statement after stating that the Inland 
Revenue Department was looking into the question, he 
subsequently said that banks and finance houses had 
been complaining about money being withdrawn to 
invest in bills "which often returned interest as 
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12 and 15 per cent." One principal motive for the 
Legislature to act to curb the then spiralling interest 
rates of bills is patently clear and at the time Mr 
Tizard spoke there had been no mention of the subsequent 
amendment to the Stabilisation of Prices Regulations 
which were invoked on December 19, 1974 to control 
profit and price controls of financial institutions. 
Regulation 6(6) specifically exempted "the selling or 
discounting of any credit instrument". 
The merchant bankers and bill dealers reflected 
to some extent the then prevailing thought on the tax 
liability (dealt with fully post). 
The two statements of the Inland Revenue Department 
are somewhat complementary but Mr Runt's allows an 
exception in the case of "individual dabbling" whereas 
the Commissioner's is more a statement with legislative 
intent for it spells out fully the approach of the 
Inland Revenue Department (but not with any reference 
to or support from the enabling statute) and lists the 
specific circumstances in which discount profits would 
be assessable. 
Neither the Minister's statements nor the Department's 
statements have any measure of consistency with each other 
and when all are read as a whole. The thought remained: 
was the amendment an initial attempt to dampen interest 
rates without more or were the statements delivered ex 
post facto with none of the speakers aware of the true 
intent and meaning of the amendment. Moreover, the 
matter reduces itself down to the question whether any 
change in the law was necessary and if the answer to that 
question is 'yes' or a qualified 'yes' then what form 
• 
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should the proposed change have taken. These questions/a~ 
necessitate• a discussion first of the ramifications of 
discounting a bill of exchange, promissory note and so 
on, then an examination of what the law was before the 
1974 Amendment and then what the law now is, and 
finally what the Legislature has achieved and what it 
might have achieved had the amendment not been so 
hasty and ill-conceived. 
Statement of simplified effect of the Act 
The dominant effect, then, of the Land and Income 
Tax Amendment Act (No. 2) 1974 considered in this 
context is the amendment of section 88 of the principal 
Act dealing with items included in assessable income. 
It provides in general terms that on the redemption 
or disposal of a bill any excess received over the 
cost of the bill is assessable. For example, say 
a 90-day bill is bought at a discount and on 
maturity is redeemed at its full value, in effect 
the discount is assessable income from the transaction. 
If the bill is not held till maturity but is sold for 
more than it cost, the profit will also be assessable. 
The new provisions apply for the income year 
commencing April 1, 1975; but the Inland Revenue 
Department apparrently does not regard them as 
suggesting in any way that profits on commercial 
bills made in earlier income years are not assessable, 
that is for the income year ending March 31, 1975, and 
for example, there already was section 88(1)(c) 
(considered above). 
The former section 88(1)(ff) which had provided 
for some years that amounts above cost received on the 
• 
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redemption of Treasury bills were assessable, is 
now extended to cover commercial bills. More 
particularly these may be stated to be: 
* Bills of sale over chattels; 
* Mortgages over chattels; 
* Liens over chattels; 
* Any other instrument creating or securing 
any charge over chattels for money owing or 
to become owing. These need not be 
registered documents. 
(The context includes the meaning given to 
chattels in the Chattels Transfer Act 19;?4). 
* Bills of exchange within the meaning of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1908; 
* Any promissory note other than a bank note 
within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908; 
* Any registered Treasury Bill; 
* Any document or agreement which has substantially 
the same purpose or effect as a bill, mortgage, 
lien, document, note or agreement referred to 
above. 
(Any share or interest in any such document is 
included). 
The important exclusions are: 
* Any debenture or bond for the payment of any 
security by any corporate body; and 
* Any mortgage, charge or other security, legal 
or equitable, over land or any estate or interest 
in land 
I 
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The significant feature of the above is: 
* What in effect constitutes a commercial bill 
The general rule is that the profit on a bill 
is included in the assessable income for the year 
of disposal. A bill is deemed to have been sold 
at a price equal to its value on the day of 
disposal, no matter what the manner of such 
disposal. If the owner of the bill dies, then the 
bill is deemed to have been sold on the day of his 
death and the trustee of the estate of that 
deceased person is deemed to have purchased it 
on that day at a cost equal to its value. 
The need for clear and unambiguous language 
in all taxing legislation has been emphasised by the 
Courts again and again. The best-known words are 
those of Rowlatt, J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. 
I.R.C. (1921) 1 K.B. 64 at 71: 
"In a taxing Act one has to look at what is 
clearly said. There is no room for any 
intendment. There is no equity about a 
tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. 
Nothing is to be read in. Nothing is to 
be implied. One can only look at the 
language used". 
Former law 
The law prevailing at the time of the enactment 
of the new section 5 of the Land and Income Tax 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1974 and obtaining when the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue made his statement 
(the contents of which have been referred to supra; 
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the effects of which are considered post) is contained 
in subsection (1) of section 88, paragraph (f), 
paragraph (ff), paragraph (g), and in subsection (3) 
and (4) all of which may be recited hereunder to 
allow some analysis of their effect. 
11 88. Items included in assessable income: (1) 
Without in any way limiting the meaning of the 
term, the assessable income of any person shall 
for the purposes of this Act be deemed to 
include, save so far as express provision is 
made in this Act to the contrary •••• 
(f) All interest, dividends, annuities, and 
pensions: Provided that where any 
securities have been acquired by 
purchase or otherwise during the income 
year, the Commissioner may, where he 
considers it equitable so to do, apportion 
between the transferor and the transferee 
any interest due or accruing due at the 
date of the transfer and not then paid: 
(ff) The amount received by a tax-payer on the 
redemption of a registered Treasury Bill 
owned by him to the extent to which that 
amount exceeds the cost to him of that 
Bill, or where the Bill is not redeemed 
by the tax-payer but is disposed of by him, 
whether by way of sale, gift, conversion 
or otherwise howsoever, the value of that 
Bill on the day of disposal to the extent 
to which that value exceeds the cost to the 
taxpayer of that Bill: 
• 
- [ 
49. 
(g) Income derived from any other source 
whatsoever. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (ff) of 
subsection (1) of this section:-
(a) Where a registered Treasury Bill is 
disposed of to a person by sale, gift, 
or otherwise howsoever, that person 
shall be deemed to have purchased it 
at a cost equal to its value on the 
day of disposal: 
(b) Where a person who owns a registered 
Treasury Bill dies: 
(i) He shall be deemed to have sold the 
Bill on the day of his death; and 
(ii) The trustee of that person, or, where 
the Bill is owned by that person 
jointly with any other person or 
persons, the person or persons on whom 
it devolves by reason of the death, 
shall be deemed to have purchased it 
on the day of the death at a cost 
equal to its value on that day. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (ff) of subsection 
(1) of this section and of subsection (3) of 
this section, the terms "registered Treasury 
Bill" and "Bill" include an interest in any 
such Bill". 
No specific reference then is made to commercial 
bills but that absence does not of itself support or 
nullify any of the statements quoted above of Mr Tizard, 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue Department, the 
• 
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chief deputy commissioner, merchant bankers and bill 
dealers because the whole of the section must be 
examined and equally more importantly the terms of 
the contract evidencing the sale to the discounter. 
If what constitutes interest received on 
maturity of the bill consequent upon its purchase 
by the discounter from the merchant bank and is 
declared to be interest either in the letter or 
deed of contract evidencing the sale, then that 
amount falls to be taxable under paragraph (f) of 
section 88(1) or (less likely) under paragraph (g) 
of the same section. That statement of liability 
to income tax is subject to qualifications and 
reservations. 
There is no definition of "interest" in the Land 
and Income Tax Act 1954; but the fruit of the tree 
is not the same thing as the growth of the trunk. A 
payment or recompense made to the discounter because 
there is a risk that the money or some part owing 
under the bill of exchange may never be repaid is a 
consideration of a different kind and is, in fact, a 
provision both for possible capital loss and a 
provision against actual loss of purchasing power 
of the money upon repayment and therefore both such 
possible capital loss and actual loss of purchasing 
power may be considered to fall under the comprehensive 
heading of "capital depreciation". Clearly interest 
properly so called is taxable whereas provision against 
capital loss and depreciation is not taxable and 
clearly too, it is essential in the documents evidencing 
- I 
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the sale to the discounter that adequate differentiation 
be made so that a legitimate distinction can be made 
between the amount of interest which is taxable and 
the amount of money paid in acknowledgement of capital 
loss and depreciation which is not taxable. The 
first is the fruit of the tree; the second item is 
the growth - or the protection of the growth - of the 
trunk. 
New law 
The law intended to apply to the tax on income 
derived in the income year commencing April 1, 1975 
(and in every subsequent year) is contained in section 5 
of the Land and Income Tax Amendment Act (No. 2) 1974 
which section provides:-
5. Items included in assessable income:(1) Section 88 
of the principal Act is hereby amended by 
repealing paragraph (ff) of subsection (1) (as 
inserted by section 13(1) of the Land and Income 
Tax Amendment Act 1969) and substituting the 
following paragraph:-
(ff) The amount received by a taxpayer on the 
redemption of a commercial bill owned by him 
to the extent to which that amount exceeds 
the cost to him of that bill, or where, the 
bill is not redeemed by the taxpayer but is 
disposed of by him, whether by way of 
sale, gift, conversion, or otherwise, 
howsoever, the value of that bill on the 
day of disposal to the extent to which that 
value exceeds the cost to the taxpayer of that 
bill. 
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(2) Section 88 of the principal Act is hereby 
further amended by repealing subsections (3) and 
(4) (which subsections were added by section 13(2) 
of the Land and Income Tax Amendment Act 1969) 
and substituting the following subsections: 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (ff) of 
subsection (1) of this section:-
(a) Where a commercial bill is disposed of to a 
person by sale, gift, or otherwise howsoever, 
that person shall be deemed to have purchased 
it at a cost equal to its value on the day of 
disposal: 
(b) Where a person who owns a commercial bill dies:-
(i) He shall be deemed to have sold the bill 
on the day of his death; and 
(ii) The trustee of that person, or, where the 
Bill is owned by that person jointly with 
any other person or persons, the person 
or persons on whom it devolves by reason 
of the death shall be deemed to have 
purchased it on the day of the death at a 
cost equal to its value on that day. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (ff) of subsection 
(1) of this section and of subsection (3) of this 
section, the terms 'commercial bill' and 'bill' 
include -
(a) Any bill of sale, mortgage, lien, or other 
document (whether or not registered under any 
Act) creating or securing any legal or 
equitable mortgage, charge, or other security 
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over any chattels (as defined in section 2 of 
the Chattels Transfer Act 1924) for the payment 
of money owing or to become owing; and 
(b) Any bill of exchange within the meaning of 
the Bills of Exchange Act 1908; and 
(c) Any promissory note within the meaning of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1908, other than a 
banknote; and 
(d) Any registered Treasury Bill; and 
(e) Any document or agreement which has substantially 
the same purpose or effect as any bill, mortgage, 
lien, document or note of any of the kinds 
referred to in the preceding paragraphs of this 
subsection -
and also include any share or interest in any such 
bill, mortgage, lien, document, note, or agreement; 
but do not include any debenture or bond for the 
payment of any security issued by any body corporate 
or any mortgage, charge, or other security, whether 
legal or equitable, in respect of any estate or 
interest in land. 
(3) The Land and Income Tax Amendment Act 1969 is 
hereby consequentially amended by repealing 
subsections (1) and (2) of section 13. 
(4) This section shall apply with respect to the 
tax on income derived in the income year 
commencing on the 1st day of April 1975 and 
in every subsequent year. 
The effects, then, of the new section would appear 
to be that the assessable income of a tax-payer will now 
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always include in the income year starting April 1, 
1975 and in every subsequent year the amount received 
on the redemption of a commercial bill to the extent 
to which that amount exceeds the cost to the tax-payer 
of the bill and where the bill is not redeemed but 
disposed of by the taxpayer then the assessable income 
of a tax-payer in the present income year starting 
April 1, 1975 and in every subsequent year the value 
of the bill on the day of disposal to the extent to 
which that value exceeds the cost to the taxpayer of 
the bill. 
Commercial bill and bill are defined extensively 
in subsection (4) of section 5, and paragraph (e) of 
the same sub-section is drawn to include any document 
or agreement which has substantially the purpose or 
effect as any other items included in that subsection 
and also included is any share or interest in any 
such items; but it is expressly stated that the 
terms do~ include any debenture or bond for the 
payment of any security in respect of any estate or 
interest in land. Subsection (3) makes consequential 
amendments to the Land and Income Tax Amendment Act 
1969 by repealing subsection (1) and (2) of section 13. 
The first point to note is that section contains 
no definition of interest, premium, dividend, or 
discount. It purports to include in the assessable 
income of the tax-payer the difference between the 
cost to the tax-payer of the bill and the amount 
received either on the redemption of the bill or 
(where the bill is disposed of) the value of the 
bill on the day of such disposal. 
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But the Legislature has fil?1 expressly and 
unequivocally said that "The amount received by a 
tax-payer ••• " includes any or all of the sums 
representing interest, dividends, premium and/or 
discount, and so it does seem arguable that a 
tax-payer could point to a deed of covenant executed 
simultaneously with his purchase as discounter of a 
commercial note in which there was clearly 
delineated a variable payment separate from interest 
or discount calculated to provide for any appreciation 
or depreciation in the purchasing power of money and 
one which was governed (for example) by the price of 
gold, the revised consumers' price index, the stock 
market index or the annual rates of inflation (as 
included in the "New Zealand Official Vital Statistics" 
or "Monthly Abstract of Statistics") and that further, 
that such sum was declared to be in the nature of a 
capital sum making the provision one against capital 
loss and one against capital depreciation in the loss 
of purchasing power of the purchase money upon 
repayment. This matter is examined post. 
The Legislature (had its intentions been such) 
could have given a definition in the section of the 
meaning to be ascribed to that otherwise nondescript 
phrase in subsection (1) "The amount received by a 
tax-payer ••• " by simply reciting that that amount 
includes all sums received by the tax-payer whether • 
called a dividend or a premium or provision for risk 
of capital loss or _provision ~ainst c.fil)i~l 
depreciation or by any other name whatsoever and 
any discount paid or given by a drawee or 
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acceptor in addition to or instead of dividend or 
premium or provision for risk of capital loss or 
provision against capital depreciation or by any 
other name whatsoever and where any such sum or 
discount is paid or giv~n in addition to interest 
it shall be treate~_~s part of that inter~~t for 
the purpose of determining the income tax liability - - - -
of the tax-payer consequent upon the redemption 
and/or disposal of a commercial bill. Nothing has 
been done by the Legislature to express its 
purported intention. Clearly it is arguable that 
a provision against capital depreciation and a 
provision to provide for capital loss does-in fact 
fall outside "the amount received by the taxpayer". 
Again the Legislature has not made any provision 
to include such and for that reason it is submitted that 
the legislation was hasty and ill-conceived and one 
that elicited such a wide variety of opinions and 
consternation (outlined supra). Too much is in doubt 
the reason for which is at least part explicable by the 
fact that New Zealand conveyancers have in the past 
not clearly differentiated in (as suggested) 
simultaneously executed deeds accompanying the 
purchase by discounters of commercial notes, between 
the question of discount and interest from provisions 
• 
for the risk of capital loss and against capital 
depreciation; but such doubt is not acceptable in 
• 
a charging Act (such as the Land and Income Tax 
Act 1954). If the meaning of a charge is in doubt 
then it ought to be construed in favour of the subject: 
--
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McGrath v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1939) NZLR 
950 and Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd v. Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (1937), 54 T.L.R. 36. 
The exact operation and full meaning of the 
section are not capable of being grasped. 
The second point to note is that the statement 
of the then Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
Mr D.A. Stevens (indicated supra) is difficult 
to equate with any of the subsections in section 88 
of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 with which 
that statem~nt was intended to advise "taxpayers 
of its" (the Inland Revenue Department's) "attitudes 
to profits made in the current year ending March 
31, 1975, Mr Stevens, said even though the legislation 
will not then have taken effect" (The Dominion, 
Saturday, November 9, 1974) and it is equally 
difficult to reconcile that statement's provisions 
with section 5 of the new Act. 
Basically, the specific instances indicated 
by Mr Stevens differentiated between mortgages, bills, 
bills of exchange, promissory notes and other such 
securities (assessable in all cases where maturity 
or sale is within two years from the date of 
acquisition) and mortgages (assessable where 
discounted when the tax-payer had entered into more than 
one such transaction or the expiry of the term of the 
mortgage was within two years from the date of 
acquisition or the discount profit was greater than 
the interest receivable for the unexpired term of the 
mortgage). The provision of "two years" was to be 
regarded as a general guide only. 
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Clearly the statement published in at least 
one morning newspaper in New Zealand is an example 
in effect of legislation or quasi legislation by the 
Inland Revenue Department. It did not appear in any 
of the periodic information bulletins issued by that 
department in 1974 and it was not until April 1975 
that reference was made to the new section 5 of the 
Land and Income Tax Amendment Act 1974 accompanied 
by a repetition of the press statement (already 
quoted above) of Mr Stevens. 
That newspaper announcement by the then Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue Department, then, was not in the form 
of regulations made pursuant to the Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1952 as amended as it should have been 
for its meaning and effect is not simply administrative; 
it is demonstrably legislative for it sets out specific 
circumstances and the conditions under which "discount 
profits would be assessable". There is a mandatory 
element in such conditions which varies according to 
the type of security or the elapse of time since the 
date of acquisition or the excess of the discount 
profit over the interest receivable. Then the statement 
concludes with a supposedly discretionary element: 
"There would be other types of cases in which profits 
would be assessable and the period of two years 
mentioned should be regarded as a general guide only." 
The matter is a revenue one and the statement made 
purports first to say that "profits made from short-
term commercial bills are in all cases liable to income 
tax •••• ", imposes a prohibition in effect by 
specifying the circumstances under which income tax 
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liability will be attracted and fails to detail or 
indicate all the other types of cases in which profits 
would be assessable. No provision is med~ in section 88 
of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 makes any mention 
about the period of acquisition or the frequency of the 
transaction and neither of these conditions appears in 
the new section 5 of the Land and Income Tax Amendment 
Act (No. 2) 1974. The statement is more than 
administrative for its meaning and effect are quite 
legislative and under its vague provisions the Inland 
Revenue Department may make and justify its 
assessments. 
In the same words of McCarthy, P. (in Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue v. Gerard (1974) 2 NZLR 279 at 280-281 
when referring to section 108 the words of which 
statement are applicable now) appears this statement: 
"One can only hope that the Legislature ••••• will 
state in precise language not only what classes 
of transactions are to be struck down, but what 
are to be the results of that action". 
The Legislature should define a test (or a series 
of tests) and/or provide a comprehensive list 
characterising the nature of various transactions such 
that the Courts can give rational judgments within such 
framework because the discretion must be sharply 
curtailed and clearly delineated; and only then can 
any aggrieved taxpayer point with reasoned arguments 
to his own case- and relate it to the criteria provided 
by the Legislature. Press statements by departmental 
heads and then a belated departmental bulletin for public 
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perusal do not fulfil this function which must be 
exercised by the Legislature so that there can be 
certainty and authority. 
Indeed, the effect (unwitting or otherwise) 
of the statement is declaratory initially that "profits 
from short-term commercial bills are in all cases liable 
to income tax even under the old legislation" and 
explanatory subsequently of "specific circumstances in 
which discount profits would be assessable"; and it is 
in this explanation that there has been introduced new 
elements ("within two years from the date of acquisition", 
"more than one such transaction", for example) which 
are clearly intended to catch transactions (but not 
all for "there would be other types of cases in which 
profits would be assessable ••• ") and imposes upon 
them liability for income tax. The immediate 
inconsistency between the declaration and the later 
explanation is that liability arises"··· in all cases 
••• " which must make the "listed specific circumstances" 
superfluous for the initial declaration contains no 
such qualification whereas the circumstances listed 
each contains elements where the initial blanket 
liability so declared may possibly be relieved or 
mitigated, (where for example, two transactions had 
been entered into but one had been frustrated or 
where the condition of maturity or sale within two 
years has not been capable of fulfilment totally). 
Indeed the element of frequency of transactions in 
itself may allow the exercise of subjective criteria 
whereas the blanket statement of prohibition and 
dissuasion initially is quite unqualified and 
• 
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devoid of any such reservations in its effect and 
meaning. 
None of the above appears in or is warranted by 
"the old legislation" or section 5 of the 1974 Amendment 
Act but that omission from both Acts does not mean 
that the Inland Revenue Department will attempt to 
interpret both "as a general guide only", so general 
in fact as to allow an initial blanket statement of 
tax liability and then apparently discretion as to 
either exemption or partial relief with no indication 
of the grounds of such. (Possibly much of this 
might work in the taxpayer's favour, at least 
initially, but favours by the Revenue do not indicate 
good law) • 
The regrettable element is that the Commissioner 
has chosen to legislate in such manner (for the 
statement is legislative in effect and upon its 
provisions the Inland Revenue Department will act 
for as Mr Stevens said "the Department felt obliged 
to advise taxpayers of its attitudes to profits 
made in the current year ending on March 31, 1975 • • • 
even though the legislation will not then have taken 
effect") and in such a way that precludes the Court 
from examining the statement because it is not in the 
form of a regulation, and because of the extraneous 
parts appearing unwarrantably such a statement in 
regulation form would not be held to fall within the 
four corners of the powers given by the Legislature • 
That contention is borne out by the fact that none 
of the detail appearing in the statement has been 
reproduced in the amending section 5 of the new Act • 
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Lord Greene, M.R., said in Carltona Ltd. v. 
Com.missioner of Works (1943) 2 All E.R. 560, 564, (C.A.) 
and again in Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd v. Lloyd George 
(1943) 2 All E.R. 546, 547 (C.A.): 
"All that the Court can do is to see that the 
power which is claimed to exercise is one which 
falls within the four corners of the powers given 
by the Legislature and to see that those 
powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from 
that the Courts have no power at all to inquire 
into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense 
or any other aspect of the transaction" 
and 
"It is the competent authority that is selected 
by Parliament to come to the decision and if that 
decision is come to in good faith, this Court 
has no power to interfere provided, of course, 
that the action is one within the four corners 
of the authority delegated to the Minister". 
Those dicta were expressly approved by Sachs, J. 
(at 366) in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Cure and 
Deeley (1962) 1 Q.B. 340 who (at 367) added: 
"To my mind a Court is bound before reaching 
a decision on the question whether a regulation 
is intra vires to examine the nature, objects 
and scheme of the piece of legislation as a 
whole, and in the light of that examination 
to consider what is the area over which powers 
are given by the section under which the 
competent authority is purporting to act. In 
taking that view I respectfully apply the line 
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of approach adopted by Lord Greene in the 
above cited cases." 
Legislation by regulation is acceptable provided 
that falls within the four corners given by the 
Legislature (in this case the Land and Income Tax 
Act 1954, section 88). 
Legislation by newspaper announcement (notwithstanding 
issue in a departmental bulletin of information months 
later and the next year) which is ostensibly corrective 
of earlier statements both by the Minister of Finance 
and the then Deputy Commissioner but which is both 
advice to taxpayers and instruction to departmental 
employees of when discount profits will be assessable, 
is a lamentable device to avoid the necessity to 
have regulations and a denial of the Legislative 
process. The purported comprehensiveness of the 
Commissioner's statement has resulted in near-
prohibitory quasi-legislation in effect in what 
otherwise might have been acceptable regulatory 
legislation. 
Clearly, the comprehensive meanings latent in 
the term "tax avoidance" (used in subsection (1)(b)) 
superficially constitute a stumbling block to the 
use of clauses distinguishing pure, legitimate 
interest from provisions for loss of capital and 
against depreciation of capital because the consequences 
will be an alteration in the incidence of income tax 
or a minimisation of liability for income tax and 
clearly, too, such provisions could conceivably 
be drawn to constitute in effect a merely incidental 
purpose so that the dominant motive of the whole 
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transaction has been the purchase at discount of the 
commercial bill with the related provisions of 
ensuring a yield upon maturity and of ensuring at 
that time against loss of capital and against 
purchasing power. 
Hitherto the leading case in New Zealand was 
Elmiger & Anor. v. C't>mmissioner of Inland Revenue 
(1967) NZLR 161 (C.A.) in which the facts were 
that the appellant contractors set up a trust in 
favour of their wives and children and sold two 
earthmoving machines to the trust on terms 
which allowed the purchase price to remain owing 
as an interest-free loan payable on demand. At the 
same time a hiring agreement had been executed under 
which the trust could hire the machines to the contractor 
at hourly rates subject to a minimum monthly charge. 
North, P. and Turner and McCarthy, J.J. were 
emphatic that the arrangement could not be explicable 
as an ordinary family or business dealing but only as 
a blatant attempt to effect a reduction in the tax 
which would otherwise be exigible. 
But now the dominant judgment is that of the advice 
of the Privy Council in C.I.R. v. Wheelans; c,r .R, v. 
Ashton (1974) 1 NZTC 61, 161 (para. 80-021). Briefly 
on the dissolution of a chartered accountants practice, 
fn,< 
offices charges formerly paid by f eir finance companies 
for the partnership's doing their accounting work were 
now received by the trustees of two family trusts (set 
up by the accountants) and used for the purposes of the 
partners' family trusts. The Commissioner assessed the 
taxpayers not only on the income returned by them but 
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also on the income returned by their respective family 
trusts. He treated the scheme as void under section 108. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that assessments and held 
that the arrangement was "highly artificial" and the 
transaction had been entered into with the principal 
purpose of altering the incidence of taxation. 
The Privy Council affirmed that decision and held 
that the test to be applied in relation to section 108 
was objective. The purpose of an arrangement must be 
determined by what the transaction effects. Tax 
avoidance need not be the sole purpose. If one 
purpose and one effect of the arrangement is the 
avoidance of the incidence of tax, then it matters not 
what other purposes or effects it might have. On this 
basis the arrangements must necessarily be labelled as 
a means to avoid tax and could not properly be regarded 
as "ordinary business or family dealing". 
The income was in fact received by the taxpayers 
and because the trusts must be regarded as never having 
existed the taxpayers must be deemed to have received 
the income for which they must be held to be accountable 
to nobody. The Privy Council held that in fact the income 
had been derived by them. 
The deed evidencing the discount of the commercial 
bill and executed simultaneously by all parties at the 
time of its purchase and containing therein a dissection 
of money in terms of pure, legitimate, interest, provision 
for capital loss and provision against capital loss 
related to an index speaks of a prudent investment 
which applies acceptable principles of accountancy in 
making provision for capital loss and against 
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depreciation of money attainable on maturity. The 
purpose or effect is not to avoid tax and admittedly it 
may be construed as having two or more purposes none 
of which is more than the merely incidental purpose 
of minimising tax liability and the more important of 
which are to preserve the capital and to ensure its 
continuity of purchasing power upon maturity. 
Indeed for the Commissioner to attribute to t he 
use of indexation as having the purpose or effect of 
tax avoidance would be to deny the acceptance and 
efficacy of escalation clauses in building and 
engineering contracts and in statutory regulations 
because, for example, the Wage Adjustment Regulations 
1974 use the consumers' price index as an index for 
the making of cost of living orders by the Industrial 
Commission and the legitimacy of such device remains 
unchallenged. It would be stretching words and 
distorting motives to attribute to an investor the 
design to avoid tax when what he has done is what would 
be carried out by a business enterprise in making 
provision for depreciation and against risk of 
capital loss. It is surely legitimate for investors 
to guard against the effects of inflation and to do 
so as prudently as possible. Such provision would 
not disproportionately deprive the State of more 
than its share of the results of inflation for clearly 
the State is one of the principal beneficiaries. 
Differentiation between capital and interest 
Index c l auses may be looked upon as a form of 
escalatory provision which initially found demonstration 
in the formation of collective labour contracts, and today ' s 
• 
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such clauses transfer the effect (or at least the risk) 
of inflation from the creditor to the debtor. In times 
of persistent inflation (as the Western world is now 
experiencing) such clauses increase significantly the 
amount of money paid in discharge of monetary obligations 
and so can increase at the same time both purchasing 
power and inflation generally. Where inflation has 
become a standard part of a country's economy then an 
index clause may be constructed for the sharing of the 
risk and effects of inflation between both the debtor 
and the creditor. 
In order to resolve the inflationary dilemma and 
its inherent social discord, widespread international 
consideration has been given to the establishment of 
a formal relationship between wage rises and price 
increases. The linking of earnings to an index 
reflecting the changing cost of living is known as 
"wage indexation". The coined word has received a wide 
currency of acceptance; but although it is often a 
proposed measure to restrain inflation, it is far 
from being a new policy instrument. In the early 1920s 
Australia used a system for adjusting the basic wage 
each quarter according to the movements in the 
preceding quarter's retail price index • 
The New Zealand Shares Prices Index is designed to 
reflect changes in the aggregate value of holding of 
parcels of ordinary shares in representative selections 
of companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
and trading in New Zealand. The frequency with which 
the shares are traded is used as a criterion for as 
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well as the value of the New Zealand shareholding. 
The Consumers' Price Index has been completely 
restructured and revised and now the new all-food 
group index takes as its base the average prices 
ruling in the calendar year 1974 (equalling 1000) 
and on this basis the index figure for each quarter 
is calculated. The previous index used was bas ed 
on 1965 prices. 
The C.P.I. basically records changes in the 
prices of the goods and services included in the 
pattern of purchases which householders make. 
But to measure accurately the effect of price 
changes it is necessary from time to time to 
investigate what the average household budget 
consists of, so that each commodity or group of 
commodities can be given its proper importance. 
This is what statisticians call "weight". The 
"weighting" for the new index is based on the 
expenditure of all people living in private households 
rather than (as in the earlier indices) on their 
actual or notional consumption. 
The Revised Consumers' Price Index 1974 retains 
the basic objective of providing a multi-purpose 
indicator of retail price changes of those goods and 
services which are purchased by New Zealand residents 
living in New Zealand. The previous Consumers' 
Price Index was revised in 1965. The weights in the 
Revised Consumers' Price Index are based on the 
patterns of expenditure of the population covered 
by the index rather than what is consumed by them. 
The selection of goods and services to be priced has 
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been widened in this revision to include more fields 
of expenditure and more pricing outlets to reflect 
more adequately both expenditure patterns of all 
residents living in New Zealand and the movement 
in prices of consumer goods and services. 
There is no principle of law which prevents 
parties to a contract from adopting a fixed figure 
as the primary monetary expression of a liability 
and then proceeding to effect a substantive 
variation of that liability by providing that 
more or less money must actually be paid according 
as index-numbers evidence a variation of price 
levels, for that is only a method of measuring the 
actual liability contracted for: Stanwell Park 
Hotel Co. Ltd v. Leslie (1952) 85 C.L.R. 189 (H.C.A.). 
The High Court of Australia (Dixon, Williams, 
Webb, Fullagar and Kitto, J.J.) in Stanwell clearly 
confirmed the legality of a contract for the sale of 
land which provided for the total purchase price, 
specified the deposit payable and the monthly 
instalments which were therein expressed to vary 
with the rise or fall of price levels in accordance 
with a specified series in the retail price index. 
The High Court's decision clearly amounted to an 
endorsement of contractual freedom to provide for 
the escalation of the purchase price corresponding 
to changes in economic activity as measured by one 
of the economic barometers. 
Eight years later, Kitto J. in the High Court 
of Australia in !:!s.ll v. Busst (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206 
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cited with express approval what Bowen, L.J. said in 
Davies v. Davies (1887) 36 Ch.D. 359: 
"There is many a contract for example which, 
instead of fixing the particular time for 
payment, provides that the time is to be 
fixed by what is reasonable in the trade or 
in the business. In those cases you introduce 
the consideration of what measure reason will 
apply, because the measure which reason will 
apply tends towards certainty, and therefore 
enables you to make up for the absence of 
distinctness on the part of the contract by 
reference to a standard which the parties had 
in their minds, though they did not express it 
on paper, namely, the standard of reason". 
Kitto, J. added that he had not found in the 
books any case in which an agreement for the sale of 
property at its value, or an agreement a term of 
which had been expressed by reference to reasonableness, 
had been held on that account to be too uncertain 
to constitute a binding contract. 
Essentially, the litigation concerned an option 
to purchase land at a fixed price "to which shall be 
added the value of all additions and improvements to 
the said property since the date of purchase by the 
granter ••• and from which shall be subtracted the 
value of all deficiencies of chattel property and a 
reasonable sum to cover depreciation of all buildings 
and other property on the said land". 
Dixon, C.J., Fullagar and Menzies, JJ., in the 
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majority opinion held that in such a contract it 
was not sufficient to specify price as "fair" or 
"reasonable" and leave this for subsequent 
agreement between the parties or failing such 
agreement by the Court. 
Kitto and Windeyer, JJ., in the minority opinion 
held that the concept of what is "reasonable" was 
constantly applied by the law and was therefore 
capable of sufficient certainty to form the basis 
of such a contract for sale of realty. 
(Some vindication of the minority view was 
subsequently provided in the much more recent case 
of Talbot v. Talbot (1968) Ch. 1, 704, in which the 
English Court of Appeal held that an option to 
purchase "at a reasonable valuation" was 
enforceable). 
To fight inflation the restructuring of progressive 
income taxation schedules has been experimented with as 
a supplementary measure to wage indexation. The intent 
of such a revision is the assurance that only real 
income increases are taxed at higher rates. Canada 
has recently chosen to index-link the claims which can 
be deducted from taxable income rather than 
indexing the tax scales themselves. The United Kingdom 
Government announced late in 1974 details of a 
proposed scheme in which the return under index-linked 
bonds would be adjusted by movements in the retail-price 
index. Limits are to be placed on the amounts which 
can be purchased so that in effect the small investor 
is favoured. 
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There is already a plethora of overseas 
literature on the use and application of index and 
escalatory clauses designed for use in taxation 
contexts and which are intended to gua~d against 
the risk of capital loss upon investment and to 
provide for the decline in purchasing power of 
money upon maturity. 
In the past the customs of merchants 
undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development 
of the commercial law; but today there seems but 
little scope for such custom to bring about changes 
in the general mercantile law. In England the last 
instance seems to have been in 1898 when debentures 
payable to bearer were held to be negotiable 
instruments by mercantile custom: Bechuanaland 
Exploration Company v. London Trading Bank (1898) 
2 Q.B. 568. 
There are, nonetheless, other and often more 
important means by which the influence of commercial 
custom may be brought to bear on law, and this is 
through the operation of commercial contracts. 
Terms may be implied into such contracts either by 
established trade usage in the strict sense or even 
by showing that it is reasonably necessary to the 
commercial efficacy of the contract to assume that 
it was entered into on the basis of some established 
practice of trade. In this way the current of 
decision of courts and of commercial arbitrators is 
able to absorb the effect of changes in business practices 
and customs, though how readily the Courts may be prepared 
• 
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to pay regard to developments in the commercial community 
may depend largely on the professional traditions of 
the particular legal system. But the much more 
expeditious method in which the commercial community is 
able to impose in an almost quasi-legislative manner 
its own practices and requirements is the use of 
what are known as "standard-form contracts" which 
without violating the concept of freedom of contract 
(the party expected to execute is still free to do so 
or not) contain generally accepted and established 
practices under which the particular field of 
commercial activity is governed. 
Optimistic obiter 
Sympathy for the taxpayer penalised by the 
declining purchasing power of money was expressed 
by Buckley, J., in Secretan v. Hart (Inspector of Taxes) 
(1969) 3 All E.R. 1196 at 1197 and 1199 when he said 
(at 1197): 
"He objects to the assessment because, he says 
between the time when be bought the shares and the 
time when he sold them the value of the pound had 
seriously decreased; and he has produced a letter 
from the Central Statistical Office which states 
that, taking the purchasing power of the pound to be 
20s in 1932, which was the earliest year in which 
the taxpayer bought any of these shares, its value 
in 1967 July, which was a few months before he 
sold the shares, would be 5s 3d. So the taxpayer 
says that, instead of deducting the sum of 768 
pounds only" (the aggregate price paid), 
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"in respect of the price he paid for the 
shares, from the price which he received, the 
figure of 768 pounds ought to be multiplied 
by a suitable factor to take account of the 
change in the value of the pound between the 
time when he paid the 768 pounds and the time 
when he received the proceeds of the sale of 
the shares in October 1967. 
' "It is a point of view with which, I think, 
any taxpayer would feel a certain degree 
of sympathy " • • • • 
Buckley, J. nevertheless upheld the commissioner's 
finding and held that the sum on which capital gains 
tax was assessed was property computed. No cases are 
cited in the judgment. 
The English Finance Act 1965 by virtue of section 
19(1) introduced capital gains tax and made no 
provision in its assessment for any deduction or 
exemption to be made for the declining purchasing 
power of money; but the discounter of a commercial 
bill is at liberty to make his own bargain with the 
finance house or merchant bank and to insist that 
terms be written into the letter exchanged between 
them or into the actual contract itself (should one 
exist) differentiating the interest element from the 
money payable because of and attributable to the 
possibility of capital loss and the actual capital 
depreciation evidenced by the decline of purchasing 
power of the money upon receipt at its maturity. 
New Zealand conveyancers (and their standard 
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reference books) appear to be oblivious to the 
possibility of escalating the price or value of 
amount payable in accordance with fluctuating 
economic conditions. But the High Court of 
~~Ov 
Australia in Stanwell Park~contract for the sale 
of land under which the instalments were made 
to vary with the rise or fall of price levels 
according to a series in the Cost of Living 
Index,~ held that there was no principle of 
law which prevented parties to a contract from 
adopting a fixed figure as the primary monetary 
expression of a liability and then proceeding 
to effect a substantive variation of that 
liability by providing that more or less money 
must be actually paid according as index-numbers 
evidenced a variation of price levels. 
Best, L.J. (the High Court of Justice (King's 
Bench Division: Northern Ireland) in Torrens v. 
Commi ssioners of Inland Revenue (1931-34) Tax Cases 
Vol. XVIII 262 drew a clear distinction (at 268) 
between "interest ••• the return given for the use 
of an advance whilst discount is the deduction 
made from the amount of the bill of exchange or 
promissor y note by one who gives value for it before 
it is due". The High Court of two were divided on 
the question of whether an amount payable by a bank 
as discot~~t on promissory notes at the expiration of 
three months could be regarded as a charge in the 
nature of interest. 
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Differentiation between capital and income 
The decision of the House of Lords in Brown v. 
National Provident Institution; Ogston v. Provident 
Mutual Life Institution (1921) 2 A.C. 222 is 
admittedly concerned with the construction of the 
provisions of the (English) Income Tax Act 1842 
and the resolution of the peculiar facts of the 
individual cases but it contains some pertinent 
obiter dicta on discounting transactions of 
Treasury Bills. The orders of the House in the two 
cases were in identical terms. Brown's case 
involved the use of the word "discount" as a noun 
in the phrase "profits on discounts" in the Income 
Tax Act. 
Lord Sumner dismissed (at 256) the argument that 
there should be a differentiation between capital 
and income: 
" ••• I see no warrant for trying to discriminate 
between the capital used in the transaction and 
the income obtained from its use. The statute 
says nothing about it. To discount a bill, 
even a Treasury Bill, you must have money or 
money's worth, but whether an accountant would 
say that it came out of or should be debited to 
capital or income makes no difference to the 
fact of discounting. The excess of what is 
got back tomorrow over what is put in today 
is profit, and it is rarely that even an economist 
can tell what is an appreciation of capital 
and what is not. The Act invites no such curious 
.. 
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inquiry as the Court of Appeal directed on 
this point". 
(Prima facie, the same words might today be 
applied to section 88(1)(c): "All profits or gains 
derived from the sale or other disposition of II • . . . ' 
and of course the measure of the profit will be 
increased or decreased by the rise or fall in 
inflated values of the property producing such; 
but clearly in making the outlay of money intended 
to produce such a risk has been taken as to its possible 
loss and upon its maturity as to the decline in its 
purchasing power). 
And then (at 257) Lord Sumner made this statement: 
"It is a most wholesome rule that in taxing 
the subject, the Crown must show that clear 
powers to tax were given by the Legislature. 
Applied to income tax, however, this is an 
ironical proposition. Most of the operative 
clauses are unintelligible to those who have 
to pay the taxes and in any case derive such 
clarity as they possess from the judges who 
have to interpret them. After the puzzle has 
been solved no doubt the answer seems clear 
and the solution is arrived at as a matter of 
construction". 
With respect to Lord Sumner it was not correct to 
say then (and most certainly not today) that "it is 
rarely that even an economist can tell what is an 
appreciation of capital and what is not". Since the 
turn of this century there have been a series of 
developing indices measuring the gold standard, export 
prices, import prices, production of the nation and 
-
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share prices all of which are today most capable of 
reflecting accurately movements in capital, its 
appreciation and depreciation. Nor is it correct to 
say that the "excess of what is got back tomorrow 
over what is put in today is profit •• " for this 
ignores the simple arithmetical device of subtraction 
to show the difference between what has been put in 
and what is got back. At its most rudimentary level 
that difference is profit and notwithstanding that 
"there is no definition of discount in the statutes" 
(Lord Sumner at 254) any actuarially minded person 
with knowledge of economics would see that that 
profit is capable of further dissection into groups 
showing/pure interest, provision for capital loss 
and provision against capital depreciation in 
purchasing power. The presence of inflation at the 
time of the Lords' judgment was no less significant 
that its pervasive reality today in the Western world. 
Indeed Lord Sumner's statement does (again with respect) 
completely overlook that index numbers to measure price 
fluctuation have been developed and calculated in 
England since the 18th century and that gold clauses 
have been one of the most consistently popular methods 
of acknowledging and protecting the intrinsic value of 
monetary obligations. It is only since the demise of 
the pound sterling that gold clauses have lost their use 
but when Lord Sumner spoke (1921) they were in current 
use; but it must be acknowledged that the then looming 
period of unemployment and economic recession must have 
both contributed to his cynicism, and this is 
understandable for almost comparable conditions prevail 
today. 
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The House of Lords in both Brown and in Ogston 
largely affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
(National Provident Institution v. Brown; Provident 
Mutual Life Assurance Association v. Ogston (1920) 
~,<JHv.l 
3 K.B. 35) the Ajudgments in which cases do (with 
respect) give much clearer insight into the kernel 
of the problem of differentiation between pure 
interest and provision against capital loss and 
provision for capital depreciation. 
Lord Sterndale, M.R. said (at 49): 
"The transactions in question consist of the 
purchase of Treasury Bills which are documents 
issued by the Government by which it undertakes 
to pay on the expiration of a term fixed in the 
bill a certain sum of money in consideration of 
a smaller sum paid down at once. The bills 
are therefore issued at a discount which is 
fixed from time to time by the Government ••• 
In some cases the appellant held the bills until maturity 
in some cases they realised them, by sale, and in 
some cases they converted them into loans". 
He dealt with each of the three transactions on 
page 50: 
II 
• • • the case where the appellants hold the bill 
to maturity is a simple one. The transaction is 
that the Government borrow the money paid for the 
bill for a certain period and pay a larger sum 
at the end of that period, the difference between 
the two sums being the amount which they pay for 
the accommodation ••• I think the amount is a 
... 
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profit made by buying a security at a discount 
and therefore comes within the somewhat odd 
term "profits on discount""· 
And then in the next paragraph he indicates the 
effect of other variables on the second transaction and 
it is these considerations which are so apposite to the 
question of the differentiation between interest and 
provision against (for example) "the rise or fall in the 
value of money ••• 11 for Lord Sterndale says: 
"The case where the bill is ,gold before maturity is 
not so simple. If all the other elements were 
eliminated the increased value of the bill would be 
regulated by the extent to which it had advanced 
towards maturity. But the other elements cannot 
be eliminated. The price of the bill in the 
market depends upon the state of the money market 
and the rise or fall in the value of money and any 
increased price attributable to these causes cannot 
be taxed as profit on a discount. In the case of 
a sale, therefore, I think that the only amount 
that can be taxed is the amount by which the Bill 
has increased in value by reason of its advance 
towards maturity and the consequent accrual of 
interest upon it. The amount of profit arising 
from the fluctuation in value of money does not 
arise from discount, i.e. the difference between 
the present value and the value at maturity, and 
does not come therefore within the words 'profit 
on a discount'." 
Warrington, L.J. could see no difference in 
principle between the first transaction and the 
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second but there is explicit in his statement (at 55) 
that there may be "variation in the value of money, 
in the public credit and so forth." He explained: 
"When a holder, whether the original purchaser 
or not, realises during currency, he really 
receives a proportion of the total profit 
resulting from the fact that the bill was 
brought at a discount. It is true that that 
proportion may not bear an exact relation 
to the period of currency but may be determined 
by variations in the value of money, in the public 
credit and so forth. But it seems to me that the 
total of the profits received by the various 
sellers after deducting losses, if any, cannot 
exceed the difference between the price originally 
paid and the sum payable at maturity, and that 
the considerations I have referred to merely 
affect the distribution of that difference 
between the various holders." 
Scrutton, L.J. took the matter considerably further 
for he said (at 59): 
"The case where the bill is sold during 
currency is a little more complicated. The 
interest or discount is accruing proportionately 
to the time expired since payment, but the market 
price may not simply be the price paid plus a 
proportionate part of the interest accrued 
at the original rate of discount or interest. 
The value of money may have fallen or risen, 
and this may affect the price of the 
,. 
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bill ••• While in taxation of a trade the latter 
element" (how much the value of the promise to 
pay had altered by the rise or fall of the 
value of money) 11 would be included in the 
profits of the trade, in my opinion in the 
taxation of interest or discount it is not 
included, for it is appreciation or depreciation 
of the capital sum." 
And he added (at 59 and 60): 
"The result in the present case appears to be 
that where the Institution has been taxed in 
respect of the year when Treasury Bills mature, 
on bills held to maturity, on the difference 
between amounts paid and amounts received, it 
is rightly taxed; but that where the Institution 
is taxed on bills sold or discounted within 
the year on the difference between amounts paid 
and amounts received, it is wrongly taxed, for it 
is being taxed not only on interest or discount, 
but on an amount increased by appreciation or 
accretion, or decreased by loss, of capital. The 
amount of assessment should be, in the case of 
each bill, on the amount of interest which would be 
received if the bill were held to maturity , 
reduced by proportion to the time for which the 
bill was held as compared with the time of full 
currency." 
In Lomax v. Peter Dixon and Co. Ltd (1943) 1 K.B . 
671; (1943) 2 All E.R. 255, the Court of Appeal (English) 
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treated a discount or premium offered in a loan 
transaction on account of capital risk as being capital 
and not income. Lord Greene (at 677; 259) said: 
"A good example of the difficulty is to be 
found in the contracts of loan which used to be made 
on a gold basis when the currency had left or 
was expected to leave the gold standard. In such 
contracts the amount to be repaid was fixed by 
reference to the price of gold ruling at the 
repayment date, and, if the currency depreciated 
in terms of gold, there was a corresponding 
increase in the amount of sterling to be repaid 
at the maturity of the l oan. It could scarcely 
be suggested that this excess ought to be 
treated as income when the whole object of the 
contract was to ensure that the lender should not 
suffer a capital loss due to the depreciation 
of the currency. 
"I refer to these problems not for the purpose of 
attempting to solve them, but in order to show that 
there can be no general rule that any sum which a lender 
receives ever and above the amount which he 
lends ought to be treated as income. Each case 
must, in my opinion, depend on its own facts, and 
evidence dehors the contract must always be 
admissible in order to explain what the contract 
itself usually disregards, namely the quality 
which ought to be attributed to the sum in 
question." 
Clearly, it would have been prudent before (and 
more importantly after the enactment of the Land and 
II 
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Income Tax Amendment Act (No. 2) 1974 for documents 
evidencing the discount of a bill to have stated what 
was interest and what was the provision against 
capital depreciation and for capital loss; and for 
the accounting records of the discounter to maintain 
such differentiation. Lord Greene in Lomax made 
reference (dealt with post) as to how the true 
nature of discount may be determined or fixed by the 
contract. 
Discounting a bill simply means the buying or 
selling of the bill before it is due for payment for 
the amount estimated to be its value at the date it is 
sold or bought. "In the discounting of bills of 
exchange, Exchequer bills etc., the discount is the 
reward and in the normal case (since such bills do not 
as a rule carry interest) the only reward which the 
person discounting the bill obtains for his money." 
Lomax v. Peter Dixon & Co. per Lord Greene, M.R., at 262. 
Earlier in his judgment (at 258) (which was concurred 
in by MacKinnon, L.J. and Du Parqu, L.J., Lord Greene 
considered the proposition that if the premium or 
discount is offered because of the capital risk involved 
rather than as compensation for use of the lender's 
money, the gain accruing to the lender should be regarded 
as capital and not income and he made the following 
observations: 
(1) If a loan is made at or above such a reasonable 
commercial rate of interest as is applicable to a 
reasonably sound security, then there is no 
presumption that a "discount" at which the loan 
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is made or a premium at which it is payable is 
in the nature of interest; 
(2) The true nature of the "discount" or the premium 
(as the case may be) is to be ascertained from all 
the circumstances of the case; 
(3) And in deciding the true nature of the "discount" 
or premium in so far as it is not conclusively 
determined or fixed by the contract, these matters 
(with any other relevant circumstances) are 
important to be considered: the term of the loan, 
the rate of interest stipulated, the nature of the 
capital risk, the extent to which (if at all) the 
parties expressly took or may reasonably be 
supposed to have taken the capital risk into account 
in fixing the terms of the contract. 
Macnaghten, J., in Davies(Inspector of Taxes) v. 
Premier Investments Co. Ltd; Hewetson v. Carlyle (Inspector 
of Taxes (1945) 2 K.B.D. 681 expressly applied the dictum 
of Lord Greene, M.R., in Lomax to the effect that a payment 
to be made on repayment of a loan, although described as a 
premium, is to be regarded as "interest of money" in the 
absence of circumstances indicating a contrary intention and 
cited with approval the propositions laid down (supra) 
by Lord Greene in Lomax. 
Conveyancing procedure 
Borrowers and lenders and more particularly discounters 
infrequently enter into their contracts in clear terms 
allowing the differentiation between pure interest and 
provision for capital loss and capital depreciation. In 
New Zealand the prevailing practice adopted by merchant 
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banks is for the discounting of the commercial 
bill to be initiated by the prospective investor with 
the merchant bank and for the matter to be finalised 
by a letter from the merchant bank setting out 
details of the bill purchased, the maturity date, 
and often both the acceptor's and drawer's name but 
there is no differentiation between interest and 
capital depreciation or any indexation with 
reference, for example, to the Consumers' Price 
Index or to the New Zealand United Trust Index or 
to the Share Prices Index. 
Inquiries made from New Zealand to twelve of the 
major merchant banks (initiated through the New 
Zealand High Commission in London because merchant 
banks are wary about disclosing such information to 
non-clients for fear possibly of litigation) show 
that their contracts do not normally contain any 
clause distinguishing capital depreciation and capital 
loss from interest itself even though obiter dicta 
cited in cases (see Secretan) does indicate a degree 
of judicial sympathy. 
Accurate conveyancing is essential in drawing the 
document executed simultaneously with the purchase 
by the discounter of the bill so that there is a 
clear differentiation between pure interest and 
provision against risk of capital loss and provision 
for the decline in purchasing power of money. 
The plain ordinary meaning of the words is to be 
adopted in construing a document. The subject-matter 
may show, however, that the words have a different 
--
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meaning from their plain, ordinary or popular meaning, 
if they are used in connection with the usage of a trade 
or profession and thus have some special, technical 
meaning. They may even be used in a special or 
peculiar sense on a particular occasion if this 
construction would effect the intention of the parties 
as collected from the document: Odgers' Construction 
of Deeds and Statutes, 5th Edn., 1967 (Editor: 
G. Dworkin at 36). And as Asquith, L.J. said: 
"Where the language of a contract is capable 
of a literal and wide, but also of a less literal 
re-
and more/stricted meaning, all relevant 
circumstances can be taken into account in 
deciding whether the literal or more limited 
meaning should be ascribed to it: II 
Parkinson (Sir Lindsay) and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners 
of Works (1949) 2 K.B. 632 at 662. 
Extrinsic evidence to support the construction of 
the words is therefore admissible but the prime duty 
of the conveyancer is to ensure that the words he 
uses are unequivocal and exact so that they accurately 
fit the circumstances of the case. Clearly if the 
variable standard is to be a cost of living index, then 
consideration must be given either to its suspension or 
revision or substitution for otherwise the carefully 
drawn provision may prove nugatory. 
New Zealand case 
Buckley, J's sympathy in Secretan had already 
largely been anticipated in and the reasons for such 
extended by McGregor J's judgment in Felt and Textiles 
... 
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of New Zealand Ltd v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(1969) NZLR 491, for in the penultimate paragraph 
of his judgment he said: 
"··· I am forced to the conclusion that here 
the dominant consideration is that the discount 
was offered as an inducement to subscribe 
for the debentures on the longest term offered 
It may have been a capital appreciation in the 
hands of the lender to offset any possible 
additional risk over the long term and the 
inability to predict the changing economic 
situations over a long period. It may have 
been an inducement to provide more liquidity 
to a subscriber who might desire to realise 
his debenture before maturity". 
The facts of the case provide the background 
to understanding the meaning McGregor, J. gave to 
"interest" and "discount". The objector company 
agreed to purchase certain warehouse and factory 
premises. In re-arranging its finances to 
provide the balance of the purchase money owing, 
it issued debentures for that amount with interest 
at 6% per annum payable on the same due date as 
the balance purchase money and at the same time 
it issued further debentures (likewise payable on 
• • • 
the same time) for the present value of the difference 
in interest for the remaining period of the term. 
The Supreme Court held that the issue of the 
additional debentures was in satisfaction of the 
balance of the futur e interest and that they were 
in the nature of interest on money (or assets) 
ill 
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used in production of the objector company's assessable 
and were therefore deductible under section 111 of the 
Land and Income Tax Act 1954. 
But the issue of the debenture to the public at 
a discount meant that the discount was not an additional 
payment or obligation for payment of interest on the 
money borrowed nor was it an expenditure incurred in 
the borrowing of money or part of the objector 
company's working expenses and therefore was not an 
allowable deduction under section 111. 
(The objector company had issued debentures of 
283,000 pounds to the public at a discount of one per 
cent, the amount involved being 2830 pounds). 
McGregor, J. recited (at 498) details of this 
and then (at 499) he continued: 
"In my opinion it cannot be said that such 
discount was an additional payment or obligation 
for payment of interest on the money borrowed. 
It has not the element of an annual payment for 
the use of money. If the debenture holder 
retains the debenture until maturity he 
receives 100 pounds for each initial subscription 
of 99 pounds. This accretion to the subscriber, 
it seems to me, is not the fruit of the tree , it 
is the growth of the trunk. It was granted 
as an inducement to subscribe to the long-term 
debentures. The subscriber's money was frozen 
for a long term and lost its ordinary liquidity. 
The subscriber was deprived of the use of his 
money for a long period except by realisation 
of the debentures at a problematical price • 
••• If debentures were issued at a premium of 
J 
J 
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103 pounds, the inducement therefore being a 
high rate of interest, the premium three pounds 
must, in my opinion, be regarded as a capital 
receipt in the hands of the recipient. Likewise 
the discount payable on maturity is an expenditure 
in the nature of capital. I cannot conceive 
that it can be regarded, in any way, as a payment 
or debit of interest over the period of the loan". 
Several important points emerge from that partly 
quoted paragraph:-
• The discount is not regarded as or equated with 
a payment of interest nor is its accretion to be 
considered as the fruit of the tree for "it is the 
growth of the trunk". There is a clear differentiation 
between interest and the sum attributable to 
discount in the sale of the debenture and by analogy 
the same consequences must follow in the sale of 
a commercial note in which in a simult aneous 
deed of covenant there is clearly recited the 
amount of interest and a figure variable in 
accordance with the Monthly Consumers' Price Index, 
the Share Price Index, or the New Zealand United 
Trust Index to reflect the fluctuations in the 
appreciating or depreciating value of the measure 
of the commodity or commodities so selected. 
• The subscriber's money had been frozen for a long 
term and so had lost its ordinary liquidity, and so 
too has the discounter's money for he too is 
deprived of the use of his money for a long period. 
t The discount payable on maturity of the debenture 
is an expenditure and payment in the nature of 
. J 
J 
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capital and not a payment or debit of interest 
over the period of the debenture and a fortiori 
so too is the variable figure in the deed of 
covenant accompanying the purchase of the 
commercial paper in which deed is set forth the 
precise manner in which that figure may vary 
in accordance with movements of index numbers 
evidencing a change in price levels of consumer 
goods and services or of share price quotations 
or of any other relevant standard which is 
a~s~. 
There is every advantage to be gained from a 
deed of covenant to be executed by all parties at the 
time of the purchase by the discounter of the commercial 
paper to minimise the taxation liability which would 
otherwise be payable/ (and to obviate the wonder 
encountered by investors as to what they have 
purchased some of whom consider they have some form 
of commercial security). 
The effects of section 108 
The differentiation between provision for loss of 
capital and provision against capital depreciation on 
the one hand and pure interest on the other is, then, one 
that is novel in the discounting of commercial paper in 
New Zealand. In itself it has its roots grounded in 
economics and in actuarial science and certainly the 
High Court of Australia approved the use of an index 
clause in Stanwell Park and the judgments of so strong 
a Court would clearly be of the most persuasive 
effect in New Zealand. 
Caution must temper its introduction into New 
Zealand because of the potentially pervasive and 
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condemnatory effects of the recently amended (it 
was enacted on November 8, 1974) section 108 of the 
Land and Income Tax Act 1954; and the Privy 
Council's advice in C.I.R. v. Wheelans; C.I.R. v. Ashton 
(examined post) under the old section offers (prima 
facie) little hope of judicial creativity in 
ameliorating the statutory rigors of the application 
of that section. 
Subsection (1) now provides:-
"Every arrangement made or entered into, whether 
before or after the commencement of this Act, shall 
be absolutely void as against the Commissioner for 
income tax purposes if and to the extent that, 
directly or indirectly -
"(a) Its purpose or effect is tax avoidance; or 
"(b) Where it has two or more purposes or effects, 
one of its purposes or effects (not being a 
merely incidental purpose of effect) is tax 
avoidance, whether or not any other or others 
of its purposes or effects relate to, or are 
referrable to, ordinary business or family 
dealings, -
whether or not any person affected by that arrangement 
is a party thereto". 
The definition of the terms "arrangement," "liability", 
and "tax avoidance" are given in subsection (6). The 
first two terms are defined so that the meanings 
ascribed to them adhere to the meanings of those terms 
in case law and "tax avoidance" includes the alteration 
of the incidence of tax, relieving from liability for 
tax and avoiding, reducing or postponing liability to 
tax. 
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It is not, therefore, necessary for tax 
avoidance to be the sole or principal motive for 
it is sufficient if it is a subsidiary purpose 
provided it is not a "merely incidental purpose". 
It is expressly stated that where there is a tax 
avoidance purpose present other than a merely 
incidental purpose then the arrangement is void 
whether or not other purposes are referrable to 
ordinary business or family dealing. 
If an arrangement is void under subsection (1) 
subsection (2) empowers the Commissioner to make an 
assessment to counteract the tax advantage obtained 
from or under the arrangement by any person 
affected by it. 
Subsection (3) provides that where income is 
adjusted under subsection (2) so that it is 
included within a person's assessable income, it 
not 
shall/be deemed to be derived by any other person. 
"Liability" includes potential or prospective 
liability. 
The commissioner has power to determine a 
taxpayer's principal purpose for entering into an 
arrangement which has a tax-saving element. If he 
finds that tax avoidance is the principal purpose 
or one of the principal purposes then he can invoke 
the section; if he finds that tax avoidance is 
merely an incidental purpose he can invoke the 
section. 
A taxpayer may not be able to surmount the 
new provisions in the amended section by merely 
showing that the arrangement was ordinary business 
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or family dealing; but clearly with the increasing 
volume of overseas literature in accounting and law 
journals on the use of escalatory and index clauses 
designed for use in a world of inflation accounting 
and intended to guard against the risk of capital 
loss upon an investment being made and to provide 
for the decline in the purchasing power of money upon 
its maturity, the Commissioner will find it impossible 
to ignore such prudent provisions and to attempt to 
condemn the agreement as one designed to avoid or 
evade income tax liability. Important and 
ancillary purposes should never be treated notionally 
as the pre-dominant purpose so that additional 
liability is imposed. If such principles of inflation 
accounting are recognised by international accounting 
standards then they deserve recognition by the Inland 
Revenue Department. 
Section 29 of the Inland Revenue Department 
Amendment Act 1960 provides that if the taxpayer 
desires to appeal to the Supreme Court from a 
decision of the New Zealand Taxation Board of 
Review on a question of law then he must within 
30 days after the determination appealed from, 
file with the Board notice of such intended 
appeal; and the Court of Appeal decision in 
Reckitt & Coleman (N.Z.) Ltd v. Taxation Board of 
Review (1966) NZLR 1032 is the authority that the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue has no power to 
waive those statutory provisions. 
Interest on Deposit Regulations 
The question remains whether the discount of 
J 
95. 
commercial bills are subject to the Interest on 
Deposits Regulations; but in any case the Regulations 
1972 Amendment No. 1 contain such an extensive 
definition of the word "interest" that the thought 
lingers that if the Legislature had wished to remove 
any possibility of discounters differentiating 
between interest on the one hand and provision for 
capital loss and provision against capital 
depreciation, on the other hand, then it could have 
comprehensively said that: 
'Interest' includes any sum (other than the 
amount received by the borrower), whether called 
a dividend or a premium or by any other name 
whatsoever, and any discount paid or given by a 
borrower in addition to or instead of interest, 
in respect of money borrowed under a contract 
of deposit, whether such sum or discount is 
paid or given before or after the receipt of 
the amount borrowed or on or after repayment of 
the whole of any part of the borrowed amount; 
and where any such sum or discount is paid or 
given in addition to interest, whether it is 
paid or given at the same time or not, it shall 
be treated as part of that interest for the 
purpose of determining the maximum rate of 
interest that may be paid under these 
regulations. 
That definition includes discounts and premiums 
paid or given at any time, and clearly had the 
Legislature inserted a comparable definition in the 
Amendment Act 1974 then that would have removed the 
possibility of a discounter differentiating between 
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pure interest under the bill on the one hand and 
on the other provisions against capital loss and 
provision for capital depreciation. The above 
definition was available for suitable amendment 
and then inclusion in the 1974 Act and the 
failure of the Legislature so to do strengthens 
the argument that a legitimate distinction can be 
made between the varying sums all comprehensively 
falling under the all-embracing term "interest". 
These two provisions against loss of capital 
and depreciation of the purchasing power of money 
must legitimately be differentiated from the 
element of pure interest but neither such provisions 
would constitute allowable deductions under 
section 111(a) which relates to loss incurred in 
the production of assessable income and section 
112(1)(g)(i) which precludes deduction of interest 
"except so far as the Commissioner is satisfied ••• 
it is payable on capital employed in the production 
of the assessable income". The reason for the non-
deductibility is that in both cases what the discounter 
has received is demonstrably in the nature of capital 
and this is the prime reason for separating that 
receipt from the element of pure interest attributable 
to the discount. 
It is erroneous to treat the whole of the discount 
as interest for a portion represents capital. 
IV CONCLUSIONS, AND THEN SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is now possible to set down a number of 
conclusions (and then to draw from them some 
recommendations): 
97. 
Conclusions 
(a) Discount of an inland bill of exchange is 
itsnegotiation by way of transfer for a delayed 
monetary consideration called the discount which 
represents the rebate of interest for the 
period before it falls due for payment. 
(b) Discounter is the transferee and the 
indorsement in his favour gives him an absolute 
title (as holder in due course) to the bill and 
thereby assigns to him rights of recourse 
against indorsers who can call upon the original 
drawer with the primary liability upon the 
bill remaining that of the acceptor. 
(c) Discounter is a term loosely used and (it is 
contended) incorrectly applied notwithstanding 
usage: if the suffix were correctly spelt 
discount.Q£ then this would mean the party who 
transfers the bill by way of sale and discountee 
the party who buys the bill and becomes thereby 
the transferee. Such correction would then 
conform to the customary nomenclature of parties 
who indorse, mortgage, transfer, assign, charge 
and lease. Hence indorsee, mortgagee, transferee, 
assignee, chargee and lessee all indicate (by their 
uniform suffix) the parties to whom some right 
and/or interest in property is transferred. 
(d) Distinctions between the discount of a bill 
and the deposit of a bill for mere collection and 
the holding of a bill as a security depend 
essentially not exclusively on the existence of 
•• 
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an indorsement but (on the one hand) the 
intention to effect an absolute transfer with 
resultant full power to go against all parties 
on the bill or merely enabling the person with 
whom the bill is deposited to receive the 
amount from the other parties: (Ex parte Twogood 
(1812) 19 Ves. 229; 34 E.R. 503 which indicates 
that such indorsement is prima facie evidence of 
discount unless the ob ject of mere deposit is 
manifest) or merely to allow the obtaining of 
that part of the proceeds in repayment of the 
debt owing under the security: Reid v. Furnival 
(1833) 1 C & M 538; 149 E.R. 513. 
(e) The prevailing presumptions obtaining in 
each of the above circumstances (discount, mere 
collection and security) are that the holder 
holds absolutely and not by way of security: 
Hills v. Parker (1866) 14 L.T. 107; Re Boys, 
Eedes v. Boys, ex parte Hop Planters ' Co. 
(1870) L.R. 10 Eq. 467. 
(f) The objects of discounting and moneylending 
frequently coincide in intention and result and 
the Courts fail to fulfil their duty under the 
Moneylenders Act 1908 (as amended) by tacitly ack-
nowledging their potential identity or similarity 
and then in failing to explor e such by examining 
the truth and substance of the documents. 
(g) Parliament ' s authority and that of the 
Minister has been usurped by the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue issuing legislative statements in 
the guise of departmental public information 
ill 
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bulletins which while purporting to be 
illustrative and explanatory of revenue 
Acts, both in effect and result declare 
and state the law and exceed the content 
of the appropriate Act and are therefore 
ultra vires and not of any legislative 
effect. 
(h) Merchant banks in New Zealand are a 
rudimentary and antipodep counterpart to 
those established for many centuries in 
the City of London and while fulfiling 
some comparable functions, the title 
"merchant bank" is a misnomer for they are 
separate in origins, activities and tradition. 
Recommendations 
(i) ~ in any reformation of the Moneylenders Act 
1908 (as amended) loan be defined to include the 
discount of a bill of exchange and~ the 
discount of a bill of exchange or series of bills 
in appropriate circumstances be deemed to be 
prima facie evidence of a device to avoid the 
Act's provisions and~ the Courts be enjoined 
to explore the intentions of the parties and to 
examine the nature of their documents purporting 
(or otherwise) to substantiate such intentions. 
(ii)~ in the next consolidation of the Land and 
Income Tax Act 1954 certainty be introduced by the 
inclusion of a definition of the word "interest" 
in relation (inter alia) to the discount of a 
bill of exchange. 
J 
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(iii ) ~ if it is the Legislature's intent to 
proscribe the use of escalatory provisions in the 
form of index clauses it should say so and that 
until such time the use of such be accepted to 
provide both for the risk of loss of capital and 
against depreciation of capital invested in 
the purchase at discount of bills of exchange. 
(iv) THAT section 108 of the Land and Income Tax Act 
(v) 
1954 be amended to remove the wide subjective 
powers reposed in the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue and to replace those with provisions 
requiring the Commissioner to demonstrate to the 
Court's satisfaction that not only is a 
transaction's ostensible purpose or effect one of 
tax avoidance or evasion but that it is also 
in denial of recognised and legitimate practices 
in the commercial world (including the acceptance 
of the efficacy of index and escalatory clauses 
designed to guard against the risk of capital loss 
and to provide against the declining purchasing 
power of money) and~ both conditions must be 
fulfilled in toto before any transaction or 
arrangement be struck down wholly or partially. 
THAT the Commissioner of Inland Revenue be forbidden -
to issue press statements and departmental 
bulletins and brochures ostensibly intended to 
be explanatory of legislative enactments but 
which are in effect declaratory of the Commissioner ' s 
view of the law and of how the department 
interprets that law and intends to apply it 
• 
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and~ all such law-making functions be 
exercised pursuant to statut ory regulations under 
the Inland Revenue Department Act 1952 (as 
amended) and~ all legislative functions 
on revenue matters be exercised by Parliament 
and the Minister by delegated authority from 
Parliament and none by the Commissioner and 
his Deputy or Deputies • 
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